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CLERICAL STUDIES.

Philosophy.

DURING the whole course of the present century, the principal field of human investigation has been the visible World. Eagerly, yet patiently and methodically questioned, it has yielded up, one after another, its wonderful secrets, investing man with new and almost limitless powers, and giving him over Nature a Kingship unknown since the Fall. It is only natural that the inventions and discoveries which have so marvelously transformed and expanded human life should stand high in the estimation of our contemporaries. As a fact, Science is the idol of the day, and whoever possesses in any special degree a portion of its magic power is sure to receive a corresponding share of the popular worship.

Yet Science is not the greatest power in this world. Deeper and more wide reaching still in its action is Thought—that manner and form of thought which bears the name of Philosophy.

I.

By Philosophy we mean here what is commonly understood by that name. Definitions we have already by the score, and it would serve no purpose to add one more to their number. The fact of there being so many only proves the great variety of meanings which have come to be attached to the term. In the course of ages

it has covered, sometimes a wider, sometimes a narrower field. A time was when it embraced all knowledge except of the commonest kind. But by little and little many of the objects which it originally embodied grew into prominence and assumed an individual existence, with distinctive names, just as in the history of Art, we see the sculptured figures gradually stand out in bolder relief and become independent statues ; or the mural paintings long spread over the walls of temple or palace, drop as it were, from them one day and become movable pictures; so in the course of ages, now one, now another of the sciences detaches itself from the common parent; mathematics first, then astronomy—much later, almost in our own times—the different natural sciences. But they left behind them the general notions and higher principles from which they proceed, in common with all other forms of human knowledge, and which, brought together and systematized, present a special and more exalted sort of science—behind and beyond nature—which we call *Metaphysics*. There remain, besides the science of the human faculties or *Psychology*, the laws of thought which are treated in *Logic*, the laws of human action, treated in *Ethics*, to which have been added, in modern times, the laws of the beautiful as the subject matter of *Æsthetics*. All these kept together, retain the traditional name of Philosophy.

It may be fairly questioned whether there exists between them a sufficiently close connection to gather them all under a single denomination. A conception which aims at embracing things so unlike has always something artificial and strained about it. Psychology is as much a distinct science as Physiology. Logic has as independent an existence as Algebra. Aesthetics and Ethics develop side by side without interference—almost without contact. Perhaps it might be said that Philosophy, as commonly understood, represents, like our knowledge of Nature, a group of sciences rather than a single one of them. But this is of little consequence for the present, as our purpose is not to examine critically the nature and unity of Philosophy, but to call attention to its great importance as an object of study for cleric and priest, and to suggest what we consider the most practical means and methods of pursuing it usefully. In the present article we will confine ourselves to the first aspect.

The study of Philosophy may be considered

As a means of culture;

As a source of influence;

As a necessary key to the science of Theology.

II.

To begin with the last, as the most direct and practical aspect of the question, we may state the case in a single short sentence. Philosophy is not merely an easier means of access; it is the only gateway through which the mind can get admittance to scieentific Theology. And the reason is obvious. Theology, as a science, owes its existence to Philosophy. Its very definition teaches us this: "rerum divinarum scientia per discursum seu ratiocinationem acquisita." Theology is, indeed, built on revelation. But a belief in revelation rests on the existence and veracity of God, which it is the business of Philosophy to demonstrate. Theology is revealed truth, but developed—*treated*, as chemists would say—by philosophical thought.

As it reaches us originally through the Word of God, written or unwritten, revealed truth is fragmentary and unconnected. From the pages of Sacred Writ come forth, in irregular succession, faint glimmerings of the unseen and vivid flashes of divine light—distinct doctrines and vague yet pregnant suggestions—symbols and facts full of meaning, which need to be realized. To elucidate all these, to classify, to evolve, to connect them; to convert confusing variety into unity and, with loose and unfashioned materials dropped from heaven to earth, to raise up a structure solid and harmonious in all its parts, such has been at all times the task of Theology, to be attempted successfully only by those who had learned to see deeply into things, and had become familiar with the evolution and coordination of thought.

And this is just the class of men who, from beginning to end, have reared the noble structure of Catholic Theology, minds trained in the schools to subtle thought and fashioned by the discipline of philosophical studies. In the encyclical "*Æterni Patris*" Leo XIII. points out the abundant use made by the early Fathers of philosophical principles and methods to demonstrate, develop and defend the teachings of the Christian Faith. "Providence itself," he says, "requires that in bringing back nations to the Faith, human science should be asked to lend its aid; and the records of antiquity attest that such was the practice of the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. The part which they were accustomed to assign to reason was neither small nor insignificant. St. Augustine sums it up concisely when he points to human science as a means by which *Faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened.*" And the learned Pontiff proceeds to develop the words of the great Afri-

can Doctor, by showing how, as a historical fact, the greatest lights of the early Church appeal to philosophic proof whenever available, whilst exhibiting, themselves, great familiarity with the speculations of the period as well as careful dialectical training.

The same law reasserts itself many centuries later. When Theology, after her protracted slumber, awakens to fresh life and vigor, with St. Anselm and his contemporaries, it is by contact with philosophic thought. As for the great theological movement of the XIIIth century, it is well known that it received its principal impulse from the introduction into the schools of the works of Aristotle. Nor was it otherwise in the third great efflorescence of theology, corresponding to the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. As in the past, its noblest representatives are invariably men of the highest philosopical powers, rich in the traditions of the schools and familiar with the most arduous problems of abstract thought. The greatest of them all, Suarez, felt so keenly the dependence of his work as a theologian on the notions and problems of philosophy, that, as he tells us himself in the *Proemium* of his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, he felt compelled to turn aside for a time from all theological research in order to elucidate them more thoroughly. To this happy necessity we owe, under the above-mentioned name, one of his greatest productions.

III.

As only a deep philosopher can be a great Theologian, so those alone who have mastered the elements of Philosophy can hope to acquire any technical knowledge of the sacred science. There is not a department of Philosophy which they have not again and again to go back to; scarce a single theological question that does not imply conceptions which it is the business of Philosophy to elucidate. Thus, to say nothing of the fundamental proofs of Christianity, which are all philosophical or historical, the doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, reposes on the ontological notions of essence, unity, personality, substance. The deepest problems of Psychology are involved in the mystery of the Incarnation. The workings of grace can be understood only by a philosophical study of the natural man. Behind the doctrine of the Sacraments, especially of the Blessed Eucharist, we reach the problems of causality, space, matter, accidents, etc. Moral Theology, from beginning to end, is based on Psychology and Ethics. In short, Theology in all its parts is so much of a philosophical science that it can

neither be taught, nor learned, nor even thought of with any distinctness and detail, unless through the medium of the earlier discipline.

Hence it is that they have never been separated in the Church. From the XIIIth century, in all the clerical schools and universities, wherever Theology was studied, Philosophy was taught beside it. In the religious orders devoted to active work, measures were taken to secure to the aspirants a thorough philosophical training. Their Constitutions and practical directions in this connection offer a very interesting subject of study, showing how fully realized was the fact we are presently concerned with, that outside a philosophical preparation, no theological science can be imparted.

Finally a priest is not only a student and exponent of the Christian faith, he is also its champion. From whatever direction it may be assailed, on him devolves the duty of defending it. Now while it scarce can be said that, at the present day, religious truth is safe from attack on any side, yet it is clear that some of its most dangerous enemies are to be found among the modern representatives of philosophic speculation. In former times, the sacred structure itself was more in peril; in our day a determined effort is made to sap its very foundations. For religion is built on belief in a personal God, distinct from the Universe, on belief in the soul, spiritual and immortal, on human liberty and responsibility. The denial of any of these truths is destructive of all faith, yet there is not one of them which is not violently assailed or contemptuously ignored amongst us. The agnostic school lays it down as a fundamental principle that such truths, even if they happen to exist, are beyond the reach of man and can never be ascertained as we ascertain the facts and the laws of nature. Thus the whole fabric of religious belief is imperilled by men who have caught the public ear and are listened to and trusted by countless followers.

On one ground only can they be met and defeated. Their difficulties are philosophical, they have to be met by philosophical argument. Authority cannot be appealed to. Reason alone is recognized as the supreme arbiter, and hence the necessity of getting a firm grasp of philosophic truth. "Because, says Leo XIII. (l. c.) in this age of ours Christian belief is wont to be assailed by the devices and cunning of sophistical wisdom, all our youth, but especially those who are the hope of the Church, should be nourished with that strengthening and solid meat of doctrine."

IV.

But the study of Philosophy is not merely a preparation for the work of apologist or theologian. It trains and equips the mind for every kind of intellectual pursuit. It imparts the methods and principles which guide investigation in every region of human knowledge. It is in particular the necessary corrective of the study of the natural sciences which, when pursued exclusively, narrows the mind to one process and one form of knowledge, leaving out man, the soul, moral liberty and responsibility, eternal truth, that is, the highest objects of human thought. Philosophy brings them all back, and begets an abiding sense of their reality. As a discipline, it accustoms the mind better than aught else to distinctness and accuracy of conception. Its constant concern is to take asunder the elements of thought, to concentrate the whole attention on each one of them and ascertain their true relations. It regulates and strengthens that unceasing play of mind by which, from every fresh element of knowledge, we are led backwards and forwards to new forms of truth. For this is the very nature of our mental activity. We observe, we compare, we reason up from facts to laws and down from laws to new and unobserved facts. The principle of causation is so deeply imbedded in our mental structure, that we are ever striving to lift up the veil and see what is behind each fact of nature, of history, of the human soul. The cause—the underlying principle of things—the broader synthesis by which they are seen in their unity—facts, no longer unexplained and unconnected, but lighted up and held together by some deeper truth—this is what the cultivated mind has ever longed for:

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas—

and what Philosophy teaches to discover. The very pursuit is elevating; it develops the highest faculties, and independently of its results, it gives such keen delight that a great thinker, Malebranche, was wont to say: "If I held truth captive in my hand, I would set it free, in order that I might capture it afresh."

The pursuit yields more than enjoyment. It brings power, power born of the pursuit and power in each truth thus won. At no period of life is there such a conscious increase of mental vigor as in the first systematic study of Philosophy. We may compare it to the ascent of commanding heights. Each step forward enlarges the sphere of vision and reveals new beauties to the eye until the summit is reached, where the purer air and brighter sky and vaster expanse of wood and water and cultivated field beneath thrill with

delight and lift up the whole soul. So in the study of Philosophy. Each new law of mind or of life, each principle of higher truth enlarges the range of mental vision and adds, as it were, new realms to the empire of thought. Well may Cicero exclaim :—*Quid optabilius? quid præstantius? quid homini melius? quid homini dignius?* and well may philosophers have seen in it the noblest form of human happiness and theologians a picture of that higher contemplation in which is found the supreme beatitude of the Saints in Heaven.

V.

The power of Philosophy is not confined to speculation. It leads to results of the most practical kind. Of all the influences that impel the human race, after religion, Philosophy is the greatest. Human passions are strong, but their reign is short-lived. They exhaust themselves quickly, and they neutralize one another in the great struggle of life. Truth never dies. Inventors and discoverers have revolutionized the conditions and habits of social life, but thinkers have acted more powerfully and more deeply still.—*Mens agitat molem.*—The power of science is irresistible, but it needs guidance. Thought gets hold of it and turns it to its own purposes.

Thought, principle, truth, or what is taken for truth, all men finally appeal to and profess to follow. Individuals and nations are ever working out a theory, true or false, which they have learned, perhaps unconsciously, from some thinker. He may have been conspicuous or unknown, it matters not. Like the seed of the parables, his thought has dropped noiselessly into the minds of men, and after a time it has sprung up, and spread, and covered the land. Rousseau in his life-time was considered by most people as only a harmless dreamer; twenty years after his death he was the inspired prophet and legislator of the French Revolution. Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, lived and died almost unknown and unnoticed, yet what a following he has had in our age! A small book of Beccaria gradually transformed the criminal laws of Europe. At the present day, the legislation of almost every country in the world is being slowly but steadily modified under the action of philosophical views. Who, again, can question the influence of the theories of heredity, of determinism, of evolution on our whole administration of justice? Who can doubt the action of our new views of marriage on the domestic life, or that of Karl Marx and his school on current notions regarding private ownership? Who, having watched the course of thought in this country and in England for

the last thirty years, does not see at once the deep impress it bears of such men as Herbert Spencer or Stuart Mill?

Thus everything tends to emphasize the fact that, taken broadly, Philosophy is at the very root of all human history and human life. But in whose possession do we find it at the present day? Often in the hands of the most incompetent—of men whose intellectual habits would least fit them for philosophical speculation. And yet they cannot keep themselves from it. Scientists, such as Huxley and Tyndal, are constantly overstepping the natural limits of their investigations and settling dogmatically the most arduous questions of Philosophy or unsettling the most necessary beliefs of their fellow-men. Only a short time ago Mr. Edison, whilst claiming to be a stranger to theory and speculation, treated us to a number of views, more or less original, on the nature of matter and life. Hundreds of thousands read them in the Sunday newspapers, and doubtless adopted them, knowing no better.

For such is the condition of things to-day. Views and theories which in former times continued to dwell in the heights where they had come to light, and percolated but slowly, if at all, through the lower strata, now permeate the social body from top to bottom almost at once. The Philosophy of yesterday is the literature of to-day. Orators, poets, writers of fiction, all those who form the public mind, seek inspiration from the thinker. A vein of philosophy runs through most of their productions, and it may be truly said that at no period of history has speculative thought been so quickly taken up and so widely and rapidly propagated.

The conclusion comes forth of itself. It is the one to which our great pontiff, Leo XIII, has given the weight of his sacred authority and of his genius in the memorable Encyclical already referred to, and of which the present paper is meant to be a feeble echo. To those who have received from above the mission of diffusing salutary truth, who are, by their calling, the light of the world and the salt of the earth, it belongs, before all others, to be the intellectual guides of their fellow-men, familiar with the devious paths of error into which the unwary are so easily betrayed, and ever holding bright before them the welcome radiance of truth, as it comes down from heaven, and as it issues forth from the depths of philosophical contemplation.

J. HOGAN.

THE TOUCH-STONE OF CATHOLICITY.

AMID the present sad and gloomy condition of society, threatened everywhere with anarchy and the subversion of the most fundamental principles of right, the one bright and cheery spot is the presence of the Church; the one supporting and encouraging sound comes from her authoritative and infallible voice. It is this voice destined ever to guide the nations, and to save the world, which, well heard and faithfully obeyed, constitutes that impregnable strength of unity in Church and State, against which even the gates of hell can never prevail. No wonder, then, if the enemies of the Church, who are at the same time hostile to well-ordered society, have always endeavored, if not to stifle that mighty voice, at least to weaken its authority and moral power. On their standard they bear the "*Non Serviam,*" which is the motto of him who was the first to rebel against God.

We cannot deny that their efforts have been to some extent successful. The history of the last three centuries, nay, of our own days, furnishes us with a sad but undeniable proof of this fact.

However, we are sure that the aims of the enemies of the Church would have met, and would meet with little or no tangible results if among those who bear the name of Catholic some had not extended to them a friendly hand, and, enrolling themselves under their standard, had not joined them in repeating "*Non Serviam.*"

These false Catholics, in the words of Pope Pius IX, "acting, as it were, in concert with the enemies of the Church, are endeavoring to establish a union of light and darkness, of justice and iniquity, by means of those doctrines which they call *liberal Catholic.*" "These men," the Pontiff continues, "are more dangerous than the open enemies of the Church, both because they second the efforts of the former without seeming to do so, and also because, keeping carefully outside of the limit of condemned opinions, they give an appearance of soundness and of fairness to their teaching, which allures the thoughtless and deceives good men (particularly among the class of young students) who would, were it not for them, firmly oppose error wherever they recognize it."[1]

The adepts of this so-called liberal school deceive themselves when they fancy that it is necessary to follow the course which they point out in order, as they say, "to reconcile the progress of modern institutions with the Gospel, and to remove the cause of dissen-

1 Brief of Pius IX given at Rome, March 6, 1873.

sion among brethren or citizens of the same commonwealth." They will effect no reconciliation, and will rather increase dissensions by sacrificing truth and by putting themselves at the service of those who claim uncalled for rights in favor of a false liberty. "No man can serve two masters;" he who attempts it must unmistakably fail.

There have been, and there are in the United States, as well as in Europe, men who are imbued with these principles of liberal Catholicism, and who, usually under the mask of an exaggerated patriotism, act up to them and endeavor to spread them among their followers, stigmatizing those who oppose them as obscurantists and obstructionists.

These "advanced thinkers," as they call themselves, can be easily recognized. "By their fruits you shall know them." In the Brief we have already quoted they are described by Pius IX as "*men who display their animosity against everything which indicates prompt, entire, absolute obedience to the decrees and warnings of the Holy See;* who speak of that See with a sort of disdain as 'the Roman Curia;' who apply the names of 'Ultramontane' and 'Jesuit' to the most zealous and obedient sons of the Church; who, in fine, overflowing with pride, esteem themselves wiser than the Church, to whom the divine assistance has been promised in an especial manner and forever."

As appears from the words which we have italicized, the first and most pernicious principle of this liberal or "advanced" school has reference to the obedience due to the voice of the Church, an obedience which is the touch-stone of Catholicity. The liberal Catholic holds, 1, that if a doctrine is not defined by that infallible voice he, as a Catholic, is free to hold or reject it; and, 2, that even if defined by the Church, its truth can be questioned, provided only the doctrine thus defined be not a revealed one.

Both propositions are, to say the least, "erroneous, and in the highest degree insulting to the faith of the Church and to her authority." We shall briefly prove our statement, and thereby show that we do not exaggerate; for the words we have used are not our own, we have borrowed them from the highest authority which God has established on earth.

A few words of explanation are here necessary to avoid any misconception of the point at issue. The first proposition of the liberal school limits the duty of obedience to doctrines that have been infallibly defined by the Church. Now there is a two-fold obedience to be distinguished, one which is of faith (assensus fidei) the other

which is of religion (assensus religiosus). The former has for its motive *either* the authority of God revealing, if the truth defined be a revealed one, and then it is called *assensus fidei divinæ et catholicae, or* the infallibility of the Church defining, if the truth defined be *not* revealed but in contact with revelation, and then it is called *assensus fidei ecclesiasticae.* The latter, that is the "*assensus religiosus*" would have for its motive the sacred authority which Christ has given to his Church, to feed, rule and govern his flock.

We hold that Catholics cannot without a sin which will entail a total or partial sacrifice of the Catholic profession refuse this two-fold obedience to the decrees of the Holy See. Liberal Catholics, on the contrary, are satisfied with the former (the *assensus fidei*), which moreover, as appears from their second proposition, they limit to the *assensus fidei divinae et catholicae*; for they take for granted that the Church (the same must be said of the Pope) is not infallible when it defines a truth which is not revealed, whatever be the relation of that truth to revelation. With regard to this point, viz.: the extension of infallibility to truths *not* revealed but in contact with revelation it will suffice here to remark with Cardinal Mazzella that "this extension is held by the unanimous teaching of all theologians, who reject the contrary opinion either as a great error, or even as a heresy."[1] Of this point we expect to treat *ex professo* in another paper.

From what has been stated it must be clear to all that there is no question here of the *assensus fidei divinae et Catholicae.* This, it is granted by all, must be given by Catholics to all revealed truths that have been defined by the Church, and for the sake of greater clearness we may add that this assensus *cannot* be given but to such truths. The decree of the Vatican Council on this point is known to all "Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesia sive solemni judicio, sive ordinario et universali magisterio tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur."[2]

The question, therefore, has reference only to the *assensus fidei ecclesiasticae*, and the *assensus religiosus.* In other words, it refers to the obedience due to the Church when it teaches truths which are not revealed, but either are connected with revelation, or simply concern the Church's general good, and her rights and discipline. It will suffice for our purpose to show that *besides* the assensus fidei divinae et catholicae, there is *another* assensus required of Catholics.

1 Card. Mazzella, De Vera Religione, Disp. 4 art 8.
2 Const. "Dei Filius." Cap. 3.

No one will deny that if the Church has been instituted by Christ to be the infallible keeper of revelation, its authentic teacher and witness, and the supreme judge in all matters that belong to it, the Church must needs have the right not only to assert the existence of her authority (which is a revealed truth), but also to declare its nature, its properties, and the range of its power; the Church must have the right to *decide* the obligation on the part of the faithful to submit to that authority. This right cannot be denied without denying the mission which the Church has received from Christ. It would be absurd to suppose that Christ would give to the Church a mission to fulfill, without giving to her the means that are necessary to fulfill it.

This doctrine has received light and authority from the words of Leo XIII, "De utroque genere nimirum et quid credere oporteat et quid agere ab ecclesia *jure divino* praecipitur, atque in ecclesia a Pontifice Maximo. Quamobrem *judicare* posse Pontifex pro auctoritate debet quid eloquia divina contineant, quae cum eis doctrinae concordent, quae discrepent: eademque ratione ostendere quae honesta sint, quae turpia; quid agere quid fugere salutis adipiscendae caussa necesse sit: *aliter* enim nec eloquiorum Dei certus interpres, nec dux ad vivendum tutus ille homini esse posset."[1]

Hence, should the Church use this right, and decide that Catholics are strictly bound to submit to her teaching even when the object of that teaching is not a revealed truth, Catholics will be strictly bound to accept this decision, and to abide by it.

Moreover, should the Church, in order to enforce her decision, make submission to her teachings on matters which are not revealed the object of a special precept, Catholics will be forbidden under penalty of anathema to hold that they are not bound to observe it. "If any man say that those who are baptized are not bound to observe all the precepts of Holy Church [whatever those precepts may be], unless they be willing to accept them, let him be anathema."[2]

Now, has the Church ever *decided* that all Catholics are bound to submit to her teachings even in matters that are not revealed? Has she by a special, solemn precept required that *assent* and *obedience* be given to her decision on these matters?

In answer to these questions we shall quote, out of many doctrines that have been collected on this subject, only a few, the clearness and positiveness of which puts the above asserted obligation beyond the possibility of a doubt.

1 Encyclical "Sapientiae Christianae." 10 Jan. 1890.
2 Conc. Trid. Sess. vii. c. 8 de Baptismo.

Pius VI in his Constitution "Auctorem Fidei" (28 Aug. 1794), which is acknowledged in Catholic theology to be an *ex cathedra* document, condemns the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia. This doctrine is expressed in eighty-five propositions, only a few of which are declared to be heretical, and, therefore, to be directly opposed to revealed dogma, the others, being simply qualified as "erroneous," "false," "temerarious," "scandalous," "leading to heresy," etc., and therefore, as directly opposed to a doctrine which is *not* revealed, but which comes in contact with revelation and is necessary for the defence and safe keeping of the same. The Pope, however, without making any distinction between heretical and not heretical propositions, commands Catholics to reject them all in the same sense in which he has rejected them, and to judge them to deserve the same censure which he has inflicted upon them. "*Mandamus*, igitur omnibus utriusque sexus Christi fidelibus, ne de dictis propositionibus et doctrinis *sentire*, docere, praedicare praesumant, contra quam in hac nostra constitutione declaratur." It is clear that the obedience which the Pope commands Catholics to give to his teaching is absolute. They are forbidden even to *think* or *judge* (sentire) of those propositions otherwise than he does in the aforesaid Constitution! The same words "*Mandamus, etc.*," are found in the Constitution "*Unigenitus*" of Clement XI, with reference to the errors of Quesnell.

Liberal Catholics know that what is called in theology a "dogmatic fact," such, for instance, as that heretical propositions are contained in a certain book written by Jansenius, is not a revealed truth. Yet the Church has always required, and requires under the most severe penalties, that her children submit their judgment to her teaching on this fact and others of like nature. Here are the words of Clement XI, in the Constitution "Vineam Domini" of July 16, 1705. They refer to the fact of five heretical propositions being contained in the book of Jansenius, called "Augustinus"—a "dogmatic fact" which has already been defined by Innocent X (1653), and more clearly still by Alexander VII (1665).[1] "Ut quaevis in posterum erroris occasio penitus praecidatur, atque omnes catholicae ecclesiae filii ecclesiam ipsam audire, *non tacendo solum* (nam et impii in tenebris conticescunt), sed et *interius obsequendo, quae est vera orthodoxi hominis obedientia*, condiscant, hac nostra *perpetuo volitura* constitutione, obedientiae, quae praeinsertis apostolicis constitutio-

1 "Quinque illas propositiones ex libro praememorati Cornelii Episcopi Iprensis cui titulus est *Augustinus*, exceptas fuisse declaramus et definimus."

nibus debetur, obsequioso illo silentio minime satisfieri . . . decernimus, et declaramus, statuimus et ordinamus." Here we would call the special attention of the reader to the nature of the obedience which the Pope declares to be "the obedience of the orthodox man." This is to be not only exterior (*tacendo*), but also interior (*interius obsequendo*), which implies the assent of the mind to the teaching of the Church, although the object of that teaching be only a "dogmatic fact," that is to say, a truth which is not revealed.

And, indeed, that the obedience of the true Catholic, as a matter of strict obligation, cannot be confined within the limits of revealed dogma defined by the Church, is also the explicit and solemn teaching of the Vatican Council. "Quoniam vero" it says "*satis non est* haereticam pravitatem devitare, nisi ii quoque errores fugiantur qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt: *omnes officii monemus servandi* etiam constitutiones et Decreta, quibus pravae ejusmodi opiniones, quae isthic diserte non enumerantur, et ab hac Sancta Sede proscriptae et prohibitae sunt." In other words the true Catholic is not to limit his obedience to that teaching of the Church, the denial of which would be heresy, but he has, moreover, the duty to observe all the Constitutions and Decrees by which pernicious opinions are condemned by the Holy See.

Hence follows the duty of every Catholic to accept the *Syllabus* of Pope Pius IX, and to reject the errors that are therein condemned. To forestall a possible difficulty of some of our "advanced thinkers" who consider it "a high act of patriotism" to ignore the *Syllabus* and the obligation which it implies, it may be useful to remark that all Catholic theologians, even those who cannot be suspected of being "obscurantists" and "obstructionists," and who like Cardinal Newman[1] and Bishop Fessler[2] doubt or deny the *ex-cathedra* value of the *Syllabus* agree in teaching that "every Catholic is bound to pay obedience to it;" that "he is required in virtue of the true obedience which he owes to the head of the Church to take for granted that all the propositions of the *Syllabus* have been if not *infallibly*, at least *justly* condemned." Leo XIII speaking of his predecessors who "magna sententiarum gravitate," and "cum probe intelligerent quid a se postularet apostolicum munus" had at various times condemned different errors, refers to the propositions of the *Syllabus* of Pius IX who "*non absimili modo* ut sese opportunitas dedit ex opinionibus falsis quae maxime valere coepissent *plures notavit*, eas-

1 "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk."
2 "The true and false infallibility of the Pope."

dem postea in unum cogi jussit, ut scilicet in tanta *errorum* colluvione haberent catholici homines quod sine offensione sequerentur."[1] Encycl. "Immortale Dei," 1 Nov. 1885.

This is not all, we have a very important document of Pope Pius IX, the Encyclical "Quanta Cura" which is commonly received as an *ex-cathedra* utterance. In this document the head of the Church "in virtue of the Apostolic authority" which he has received from Christ solemnly condemns the very error of the liberal school of which we are treating, and "wills and commands that it be held as reproved, proscribed, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church." It matters not whether they be "timid" or "fearless" thinkers. "We cannot pass over in silence," these are the words of the Sovereign Pontiff, "the *audacity* of those who not enduring sound doctrine contend that 'without sin and without any sacrifice of the Catholic profession, *assent* and *obedience* may be refused to those judgments and decrees of the Holy See, whose object is declared to concern the Church's general good, and her rights, and discipline, provided only they do not touch the dogmas of faith and morals.' But there is no one who does not clearly see and understand how grievously this is opposed to the Catholic dogma of the full power divinely given by Christ our Lord to the Roman Pontiff of feeding, ruling, and governing the Universal Church."

These words prove: 1, that the Church has authority to teach not merely points of doctrine which touch the dogmas of faith and morals, but also whatever concerns the Church's general good, her rights and her discipline: 2, that to *this* teaching "*assent and obedience*" cannot be refused without sin, and without some sacrifice of the Catholic profession: 3, that the liberal Catholic opinion limiting as it does the assent and obedience only to infallible judgements which touch the dogmas of faith and morals "is grievously opposed to the dogma of the full power of the Roman Pontiff:" and 4, that this opinion is expressly condemned by the Holy See as an "error" held by those "whose audacity makes them unfit to endure sound doctrine," and as a "pernicious doctrine" which "every child of the Catholic Church is *bound* to hold as condemned."

It might seem that nothing clearer could be said in condemnation of the liberal Catholic opinion; however if we read the Brief

1 Those who desire to see the arguments in favor of the *ex-cathedra* value of the *Syllabus* might consult with profit *Card. Mazella*, "De Vera Religione," Disp. 5, art. 6; *Schrader*, "De Theologia generatim," p. 136 et seq.; *La Civiltà Cattolica* (1887. Serie 13, vv. 4, 5); *Etudes Religieuses*, (May 1875); *Dublin Review*, (April and July, 1875); The *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, (1866, p. 87-95), etc.

Gravissimas of Dec. 11, 1862 of the same Pontiff we shall find words which if not clearer, are certainly stronger. We shall give the exact statement of the Pope: "Ecclesia, ex potestate sibi a divino suo auctore commissa, non solum jus sed officium praesertim habet non tolerandi, sed proscribendi ac damnandi *omnes errores*, si ita fidei integritas et animarum salus postulaverint; et *omni philosopho, qui ecclesiae filius esse velit*, ac etiam philosophiae *officium incumbit* nihil unquam dicere contra ea, quae Ecclesia docet, et ea retractare de quibus eos Ecclesia monuerit. *Sententiam autem quae contrarium docet omnino erroneam, et ipsi fidei ecclesiae ejusdemque auctoritati vel maxime injuriosam esse edicimus et declaramus.*" Which in plain English means that the liberal Catholic doctrine is by the supreme Head and Doctor of the Church "said and declared to be altogether erroneous, and in the highest degree insulting to the faith of the Church and to its authority."

In the "Syllabus Errorum," the 22d *condemned* proposition reads as follows: "The obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are strictly bound is restricted only to those doctrines which are proposed by the infallible judgement of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all."

Leo XIII is not less explicit than his predecessor. Speaking in his Encyclical "Sapientiæ Christianae" of this same obedience to the Church, he tells us that this obedience, which "must be *perfect* and *absolute*," is "the characteristic mark whereby true Catholics have always been and are recognized"—it is *the touch-stone of Catholicity*. Now which are the limits of this perfect and absolute obedience? To this question Leo XIII answers as follows: "In constituendis obedientiae finibus *nemo arbitretur* sacrorum Pastorum maximeque romani Pontificis auctoritati *parendum in eo dumtaxat esse*, quod ad dogmata pertinet, quorum repudiatio pertinax disjungi ab haereseos flagitio non potest. Quin etiam *neque satis es* sincere et firmiter assentiri doctrinis, quae ab Ecclesia, etsi solemni non definitae judicio, ordinario tamen et universali magisterio tanquam divinitus revelatae credendae proponuntur: quas fide catholica et divina credendas Concilium Vaticanum decrevit. Sed hoc est praeterea in officiis christianorum ponendum, ut potestate ductuque Episcoporum, imprimisque Sedis Apostolicae regi se gubernarique patiantur."

To these we shall add one more document expressing, as we think, the duty of obedience of which we speak, in the clearest and most forcible manner that could be conceived. It is taken from the

well known Encyclical "Immortale Dei" of the same Pontiff. "In opinando *quaecumque* Pontifices Romani tradiderunt vel trad*i*turi sunt, singula *necesse est* et tenere judicio stabili comprehensa, et palam, quoties res postulaverit, profiteri. Ac nominatim de iis, quas *libertates* vocant novissimo tempore quaesitas, *oportet* Apostolicae Sedis stare judicio, *et quod ipsa senserit idem sentire singulos.*"

The point we undertook to prove against the liberal school is, therefore, made manifest. All the documents which we have quoted clearly assert *the duty* by which all Catholics are bound to submit their judgment to the teaching of the Church not only in matters that are revealed, but in those also that are *not* revealed and concern the safety, defense and explanation of revealed truths, the general good of the Church, her rights, and discipline. Will any one dispute the right of the Church to assert this duty? Is she not the *only* supreme and infallible judge of the rights she has received from her divine founder? Has, then, the Church erred in asserting this duty? If so, in spite of the divine assistance promised to her "all days even to the consummation of the world," she has repeatedly declared to be sinful what is not sinful; she has solemnly pronounced to be necessary for the safe keeping of the Catholic profession what could be omitted without *any* sacrifice of it. In other words she, who was constituted by Christ to be our guide in the path of truth and virtue, has shamefully deceived us; she has failed in her mission, she is no longer the true Church of Christ!

We are sure that our "advanced Catholic thinkers" will shrink with horror from this heretical conclusion. Let them then shrink with equal horror from their "pernicious principles" which will logically and ultimately lead them to that conclusion. "Muta antecedentia" is the golden advice of St. Augustine "si vis cavere sequentia."

The Church is built upon a rock, and that rock is the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ and the successor of St. Peter. Whoever dashes against that rock will sooner or later lament the effects of his temerity. "Qui ceciderit super lapidem istum, confrigetur, super quem vero ceciderit, conteret eum" (Math. 21.44).

S. M. BRANDI, S. J.

DR. BOUQUILLON ON THE SCHOOL QUESTION.

FROM the beginning to the present men have differed, and it is not saying too much to assert that they will continue to do so to the end, where some authority which merits their respectful submission will not make them of one mind. This general proposition can be applied to the Church also; and so well known is the fact that it has given rise to the adage: In things necessary, unity; in things uncertain, freedom of opinion; in all, charity. We shall endeavor to follow this wholesome rule in what we are going to say.

Just now a very vital subject has come up for discussion in the Church in the United Sates; so vital that, in the opinion of the writer, the matter comes under the first head of things necessary, and does not admit freedom of opinion, but calls for absolute unity of thought and action. The discussion has been started by the earnest anxiety of the Most Rev. Archbishop of St. Paul, Minn., to settle—on a basis of kindly spirit towards our non-Catholic fellow-countrymen, and in order to meet some wants of the mass of Catholics, very many comparatively recent emigrants and their children in the new world—the school question that has so long exercised the minds of our best men and taxed the energies and resources of our people. But much as we share in common this kindly spirit towards our fellow-citizens, and are grateful for this zealous manifestation of charity, we cannot accept the mode which is proposed as a settlement of the difficulties of the day. The Faribault matter occupies a secondary place in the question. It is an outcome of the solution proposed, and in point of time does not antedate it. We believe there are circumstances connected with that occurrence, at least in the manner in which it was effected, for which the Most Rev. Archbishop of St. Paul is not responsible. His acceptance of all responsibility is in the nature of a chilvalrous assumption of the shortcomings of a subordinate. Even in the Church the subordinate is not always strict in his duty of submission to his ordinary, nor docile to his wishes in that for which a moment's thought should make him see that one above him must bear the responsibility. Is there something in the air of America which affects us all this way, from the highest to the lowest, in the army, in the State, in the Church?

The pamphlet of Professor Bouquillon, of the Catholic University at Washington, is the bugle-note that the battle is on and the combatants prepared. He wrote because he was told to write. Who told him? His "ecclesiastical superiors." He says in his introduction: "He has written this pamphlet at the request of his eccle-

siastical superiors." What he writes, therefore, can properly be taken as an authoritative exposition of their views, the more so as we are informed in two interviews—one in St. Louis with the Rt. Revd. Rector of the Catholic University, and the other in New York with the Most Revd. Archbishop of St. Paul—that the views of Professor Bouquillon are in agreement with their own.

Revd. Dr. Bouquillon, as was to have been expected, has treated the question with much learning and research. His pamphlet is no ordinary one, and this makes it the more desirable that those who differ with him on this question should express their opinion, with due deference, but manfully, and with weight of reason also. The learned Doctor states he writes only theoretically, to establish his principle; he is too recently arrived to judge of what should be done in practice; besides, that is not his line; that belongs to his "ecclesiastical superiors"—all the same, however, he has furnished the powder and loaded up the guns. We should have been better pleased if it had been smokeless powder, for there appears to us to be a certain amount of mist that obscures quick perception of delicate points. For instance, there is a looseness in his manner of reasoning which impresses us with the conviction that he writes under the imperious influence of the εἴδωλον in his mind, apart from the desire of those over him. As a general rule French ecclesiastics—and no one loves them better than ourselves—labor under the influence of the *cultus gubernii*. "Le gouvernment" has a great claim on their regard, and in general the authority of France, even under the republics she has seen, has been thrown in favor of that Church of which she is the eldest daughter. But a long time ago—in 1662 and the years which followed it—the magnifique monarque imposed upon the clergy his way of thinking, and notwithstanding the fact that he was too good a Catholic and too sensible a man not to revoke his decrees, the influence of them remained; and this, taken with the power of Jansenism and Gallicanism, has brought about a habit of thought which is at variance with the cordially received definitions of the Vatican Council, though we willingly grant not maliciously. It is rather the unconscious form of thought begotten of habit; a form which leads to a kind of worship of the States. At the same time, be it said, that there are no more staunch defenders of what is of faith than the clergy of France and their missioners and religious the world over. They are in the van in spreading the faith and in training men for this great work, and everywhere throughout this country is the impress of their labor and foresight.

To come to the mistiness, the Rev. Professor cannot find fault with us in thus speaking as he has expressed himself in like manner with regard to the reasoning of the Civiltà Cattolica and of Costa Rossetti. On page 12 he has the following argument which he considers apodictical: "Civil authority has the right to use all *legitimate* (italics ours) temporal means it judges necessary for the attainment of the temporal common welfare, which is the end of civil society." This major premise requires distinction; it is too sweeping; and it makes the government a judge in its own case, in determining what is legitimate and what is not. "Now," the minor proposition goes on to say, "among the most necessary means for the attainment of the temporal welfare of the Commonwealth is the diffusion of human knowledge." This we are disposed to grant though something might be said in reference to the wording "most necessary;" we should be inclined to modify it, and use the words very useful, as nations have been moral and prosperous and happy without this diffusion of human knowledge as imparted at the present day. We are in favor, however, of this diffusion under proper auspices. The conclusion of the syllogism follows: "Therefore, the civil authority has the right to use the means necessary for the diffusion of such knowledge, that is to say, to teach it, or rather have it taught by capable agents." *Latius patet*—too much Professor! You have left out one important word in your conclusion—the word *legitimate* which restricts the word *necessary* and then you need another syllogism to get in your explanation or enlargement of the conclusion "*to teach or have taught.*" Some things of this kind have struck us in reading this pamphlet, and they serve to obscure the issues and mislead. Of course, there is no such intent on the part of the Rev. Professor; of this we are persuaded. But the closer we adhere to logical rules the better, in a pamphlet, as in a thesis from the professorial chair.

To come to the question at issue, had the learned writer confined himself to the statement he makes, p. 15, that the action of the State must be supplementary, few except extremists would find fault with him. Is not the supplementary work of giving Catholic schools the portion of the taxes the Catholics pay, what we have been asking for? Those who are favoring a direct superintendence of the State have the same object in view; they want the "current expenses of the school" paid. The State will find itself out so much just the same. Letting us have the fund and educate in our own way, in a Catholic way, that is the just and manly thing to do. So thought

Chief Justice Taney, who urged agitation in moderation, to obtain this result. So also thought James Russell Lowell, as he expressed himself in the interview lately published.[1] A prominent editor in an Eastern city recently said to the writer, that so diffused had a similar conviction become, that he would not be surprised to see it take a permanent hold on the country, should a prominent and popular educator advocate it. It is a well-known fact that others besides Catholics are taxing themselves to support their schools without this "supplementary" aid of the State. The Methodists, the Lutherans, the Episcopalians, and of late the Presbyterians. In view of the fact that this movement in favor of religious education is spreading, we cannot but look upon it as unfortunate that a thesis has been published, advocating subjection of Catholic schools to the State control, and in the vital matter of the studies and text books, of course. It is to be supposed that those who favor this step, take for granted they can control all this. But can they? If attention be not attracted to what they are doing, it might be possible. But attention will be attracted to their actions, and has been already. In the letter of Mr. S. B. Wilson, secretary of the Board of Education of Faribault, lately written to calm the excited feeling of the non-Catholic population who thought that the Public School had surrendered to the Catholic Church, and which was published in the *Christian Union* of October 8, last, he says: People need not fear, as the present arrangement is not a permanent one, and the children may be divided up according to wards and scattered among the public schools of the town.

The teachers, who, Mr. Wilson goes on to state, compare favorably with "our teachers" in ability and education, may have to modify their dress. Why? Because they are religious women, and wear the garb of their order? Shades of Queen Elizabeth, of James the Second, and of the sainted rulers of England! How they must flit in glee as they see their spirit still lingers in the XIXth century, and in America the land of the free!

This only shows what is liable to happen, and how those who are going in this direction, are trusting to chance and tempting Providence. But as we said, the Faribault case is a secondary matter. What is boldly advocated is State-control of education—and, so prominently, that the parents' right and the Church's right sink into comparative insignificance. As Professor Bouquillon declares: "the right of the State is *to supplement*;" that is, the State is to take

1 Catholic Review.

the place of parent when the parent neglects his duty, or teaches vice and immorality; to aid the parent when he is doing his duty and teaching or having taught by those to whom he entrusts his offspring. Let us hear what Professor Costa Rossetti has to say on this point. Thesis No. 151 of his Moral Philosophy has these words: The primary duty of civil authority is the care of the juridical order—the law; its secondary duty is to assist, to give aid; "munus primarium auctoritatis civilis est cura ordinis juridici; secundarium, oblatio subsidiorum." In his Thesis No. 154, speaking about personal rights he teaches: The personal good of each one which makes up the matter of general rights is not within the sphere of civil authority formally and directly; although civil authority may extend itself indirectly to that matter. "Bona singulorum personalia, quae materiam jurium generalium constituunt formaliter et directe in sphæra auctoritatis civilis non continentur; quamvis hæc ad illa indirecte se extendat." How civil authority may indirectly extend itself to this matter of general rights, the personal good of each one, he explains: by reason of the influence on it of what authority has a right to do. In this way Costa Rossetti safe-guards individual rights, which he tells us the State has no authority over except in so far as, legislating within its sphere for the public good, its action indirectly affects individual right.

Thesis 175 says: "Civil authority can indeed found schools and direct those founded by it; but of itself it cannot prohibit citizens from opening schools, even public schools; putting in order and directing the schools they open, without however permitting absolute liberty in teaching." This absolute liberty to teach he explains to be: First, the establishment of schools without any regard to already existing schools, their nature and number; Second, The power to teach everything even though contrary to religion or morality.

In this thesis Costa Rossetti admits the right of the State very clearly to found schools, but it is nothing more than the supplementary action which the State must extend to the people should they need it. Certainly a great deal can be said in favor of a State founding or favoring education, provided it be disposed to found and favor schools that are Christian. The difficulty with us is that the State officially is debarred from protecting any one church. It has therefore no choice, and the American public school maintained by the State is the non-sectarian school which Catholics cannot in conscience accept. Nor can they accept any

compromise which may eventually ignore their faith, and make the pupils think less of it.

The manly and straight-forward course is therefore to let our fellow-countrymen, with all due deference understand this, and place before their minds the reasons which should lead them to appreciate what an injustice it is to those who cannot conscientiously accept their schools, to withhold from them their share of the public funds, or to refuse to allow them to carry on their schools in their own way, where such share of the public funds is given. The funds should supplement the work of Catholics, and not be a title to control. Any compromise means that we cannot obtain all our rights, and that we give up something which is our due, to save the rest. This is not right on the part of the State, nor is it safe for us to accept it. Individual rights are sacred things. As an American the members of whose family have fought the battles of the country for three generations before him, beginning with the Revolutionary war, we are intensely attached to the maintenance of the people's rights, and it is moreover Catholic teaching that it is the duty of the State to respect them. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty ; and the American people should recognize and stand by the principle that a wrong done to one, curtailing his liberty, is a wrong done to all, tending fatally to eventual loss of liberty, to the absorption of all right by a powerful centralizing State. We should watch the efforts made for this purpose from whatever sources, and especially the efforts of narrow men to amend the Constitution, as is just now proposed, to prevent those religiously inclined having aid from the State to help care for their orphans and destitute, for whom a non-sectarian State would either provide no religious training, or that which is objectionable.

The pamphlet of Professor Bouquillon has been replied to by F. Holaind, S. J., in a solid and able manner. This is not our opinion only, it is that of able men. And we make this remark because a slur has been cast on his work. We do not think we violate confidence when we state that Rev. F. Holaind did not especially represent the great order of the Jesuits, as has been remarked, but that he did represent others outside of it, who are grateful to him for the principles he defends, which are the basis of just and stable government.

FRANCIS SILAS CHATARD.

THE RIGHT OF INSTRUCTION.

Education: To whom does it belong? By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D.D.

The Parent First. By Rev. R. J. Holaind, S.J.

THE burning issue just now with Catholics in the United States is the School Question. Started by what appeared to be the cold and stiff necessity of actual conditions, it was quickly fanned into a hot flame by a northwestern blizzard, and very recently received new energy from a southern sirocco blowing along the lines of abstract theory. The question has become public in the fullest sense of the word, not only on account of its universal importance, but also by the general interest which it has awakened. The two pamphlets mentioned above occupy important places in the present controversy; both have earned praise and blame, and both have got, rather than begotten, ardent friends and foes. It will, therefore, be of some interest to pass them in review and compare their relative position and strength. Having carefully read both, section by section, we are left under the impression that, with the exception of only one important point, there is very little difference between the opinions of the excellent writers. While the first gives a short and clear exposition of the theoretical principles only, the second calls chiefly attention to their practical bearing. The latter seems to us only a necessary supplement (corrective in part) of the former. We say *necessary;* for by confining himself to the statement of the mere theory within such narrow limits, Dr. Bouquillon has laid himself open to being misunderstood in more than one point. If he had only given us a hint, at times, how the principles were to be applied, the general reader would more easily catch the real and full meaning of the author. We fear that his pages will be used in support of conclusions and of practical purposes, which are not contained in the premises. Fr. Holaind's pamphlet serves to correct such abuse, at the same time that it takes exception to some of the opinions stated.

Let us remark right here for the general reader, that when there is question of the rights of the State in connection with education, a source of much confusion lies in the indiscriminate use of the term *education* itself. While in a general sense it may refer to any imparting of knowledge, physical or moral, secular or religious, yet it is more properly used to indicate the moral and religious training, the forming of character, while in order to designate physical and

secular training and the development of the intellect, we use the term *instruction*. Webster in his dictionary (s. v. education) clearly defines: "*Education* is properly to draw forth, and implies not so much the communication of knowledge as the discipline of the intellect, the establishment of the principles and the regulation of the heart. *Instruction* is that part of education which furnishes the mind with knowledge." Tommaseo says: [1] "*Instruction* regards the mind; *education* embraces the whole man; the object of the former is truth, that of the latter whatever is true and good and useful and becoming. Instruction without education avails nothing, rather it is injurious. . . . The education given by a poor woman may do more good than the instruction given by a learned man. Where those who are to instruct, have not also the required virtue, the authority, and the intention to educate, at least indirectly, there society will necessarily suffer." It is easy to see what disastrous confusion must arise from a loose, indiscriminate use of these terms when we inquire into the right to educate, the qualifications of the teacher, the method to be applied, etc. What may be true of instruction, may be false of education. Nor would it be at all logical to conclude from one to the other, or to say that the right to instruct includes the right to educate. Hence, if education is here taken in its specific meaning as the moral training of man, it would be unwise to assent unconditionally to propositions such as the following: "This authority (over education) is included in that general authority with which the State is invested for promoting the common good, for guaranteeing to each man his rights, for preventing abuses." Morality is directly and by intrinsic necessity based upon and connected with man's relation to God and his last end; hence it belongs *per se* and immediately to religion. The State may deal with it only in as much as the immoral actions of man trespass on the rights of society and thus become civil crimes. Morality as such comes within the competency of the secular power only then and in so far, when and in as much as the State may control public religion. This, Catholic writers tell us, would happen in the mere natural order of things. For organized society *qua talis* is as truly bound to practice morality and religion (social or public), as the individual is. There must, therefore, be an authority to regulate and control this public religion even in the mere natural, *i. e.*, civil society, and if God do not appoint himself the subject on whom this duty and authority rests, it devolves by necessity upon the existing civil authority. But in the present economy God has established a

1 Dizionario dei sinonimi p. 1482.

religious authority distinct from the State, the Catholic Church. And even in "regard to those moral truths which belong to the natural order, but which the pagan philosphers have never fully known, and which modern pagans forget and distort," Fr. Holaind observes "that the Church has the mission to teach those truths; for, although they do not singly transcend natural reason, yet it is morally impossible for men to acquire the knowledge of all, and even to retain the knowledge once acquired, without the help of an infallible exponent." Education, therefore, belongs no longer independently to the civil authority, but is the direct and primary object of the Church. Nor can one separate in reality the mere natural education from the supernatural in one and the same person.

All the right which under the existing economy remains to the Christian State, that is, to the Government of a Christian people, in regard to morals and religion, and consequently in regard to education properly so called, is to second the object and efforts of the Christian Church. When Catholic writers affirm that "auctoritate sua debet status civilis compescere doctrinam et docentes impios, et quantum in se est bonam doctrinam bonosque mores fovere verbis et exemplis" (*Zigliara*, Philos. vol. iii, l. i, c1., a. 5, n. viii.), they always imply the restrictive clause: "servata subordinatione ad ecclesiam," and all of them equally maintain that such a right is only indirect, or mediate. We know that assertions like these are not palatable to those who refuse to acknowledge the superiority of the Church over the State, but in discussions like the present we have no right to set aside the Church of God, or to deny that the American people is Christian.

Speaking of the relative functions of instruction and education, a very important distinction is likewise to be made between *elementary* and *higher* education (taking the term in that wider sense, in which it is generally understood). Catholic writers on the whole agree that in proportion as higher education advances from class to class, from college to university, it becomes less necessary that the mental discipline, the training and development of the mind, should be absolutely united with the moral discipline. This follows from the nature and method of higher mental training as well as from the personal condition of the learning youth, although even then education must never be wholly separated from instruction. On the other hand, not only Catholics but all serious-minded Christian men are of one accord in maintaining that the instruction of the child cannot be separated from education. During those early years, they say,

when the child begins to learn how to read and write and number, when reason first opens and unfolds its powers, and the heart wakes up, moving to and fro along the avenues of sense and feeling—whatever instruction the child then receives is and *of necessity must be* education. On account of the singular nature of the infant-soul and its mysterious activity, whatever touches it will leave its impress on the heart more than on the mind. In other words : you cannot instruct the child without educating it.

But here a question arises which is of greater consequence than may at first appear. Suppose a case where instruction is *inseparably* joined with education for good or bad—can he, to whom we must allow the right to instruct, but who has neither right nor mission to educate, assert and exercise his right to teach so long as no other provision is made for the proper education of the child? Would not the right to teach in such a case remain, as they say, *in suspenso* for the time being?

Against the assertion that in childhood instruction cannot be separated from education, it has been urged that in the soulless schoolroom the strict order of the class, the unity of mechanism which makes a hundred children as it were but one, the constant exercise of the mind in gathering the diverse fragments of elementary knowledge, all preclude any direct influence upon the heart. Hence public elementary instruction is not necessarily education, as it would be if given by the parent at home.

But does not this imply the admission that in the public school the child's heart is left wholly inactive or put to sleep? That the circumstances mentioned alter for a time the child's natural condition? That they suppose the impressionable child to be a grown person who has learned in a degree to control his impulses and direct his attention? That the mechanism of the school deadens the bright eyes, the quick ear, the anxiously curious mind, the sharp sense and the soft feeling of the boy or girl? Wherever the child may be, in church or at school, at home or on the street, his heart governs the mind, feeling runs away with reason, impulse hinders reflection, impression is stronger with him than argument. In reality, instruction itself becomes impossible at that age without education. Moreover, in the case of the child, no education is equivalent to bad education. We repeat, elementary school instruction is necessarily education, either good or bad ; there is no medium, and the instructor who teaches in those schools without providing at the same time the proper education, forfeits his right and authority to teach because his instruction

which is necessarily defective and partial, becomes injurious to the young heart. This is a question of principle with Catholics. It is the reason why the Church has condemned *in principle* any elementary school system among Christians which discards Christian education, as P. Holaind clearly shows.[1]

That primary schools, in as much as they supply the place of the family, must make it their object to impart education, not merely instruction, is beautifully set forth in the pastoral letter of the *Belgian Episcopate*, 7 Dec., 1878. They say: "The voice of religion is one with the voice of nature in proclaiming that the education of children belongs not to the State, but to their parents, and that it is for them at once a right and a duty. The teacher is simply the representative of the father; he is a delegate charged by the latter to advance and finish the noble task of educating his children; and to fulfill the task he ought to instruct and bring them up in such a manner that they may find the training at school a supplement of home training. . . . . Can it be denied that the education of the family must be based on religion, and that the first desire of the father who entrusts his child to a school, is to see it receive not only solid instruction, but rather an education which will render his child docile, respectful, God-fearing—in a word to obtain for it a religious education? To open, at the cost of the public treasury, schools from which religious teaching and religious influence are banished, in order to instruct the children only in the elements of letters and profane sciences, is nothing else than to use the money of the parents to pay for an education which their heart and their consciences must equally condemn."[2]

It is not always easy, as we have before intimated, to recognize at a glance whether Dr. Bouquillon speaks of education in its more general or in its restricted sense. Whilst we admit and maintain the direct mission and authority of parent and Church to educate, we cannot consistently with Catholic principle allow the same right to the State; nor do we believe that Dr. Bouquillon actually holds this. On p. 5 he informs us that his object is to determine what are the relative rights of parent, State and Church "in the intellectual formation of man;" he asks only whether the State has a "right of teaching human knowledge" (p. 11), such as will give to the nation "citizens able to take interest in the commonwealth, workmen that

1 Page 16.

2 See an article by Prof. Lamy in the *Dublin Review*, July, 1879, on "The Education Question in Belgium," where excellent material will be found throwing full light on the so-called "Poughkeepsie and Minnesota plans."

are intelligent, surveyors that are skilful, physicians that are experienced, jurists that are learned," a people superior in agriculture, industry, arts and war (p. 12); he affirms (p. 19) that the State has a special duty "of providing education in the letters, sciences and arts", and (p. 27) that the obligatory minimum of instruction comprises as a rule the famous three R's. Hence, while we cheerfully grant with Dr. Bouquillon to individuals and societies, secular and religious, the right to instruct or to impart secular knowledge, we do as firmly deny with Fr. Holaind that the State has the duty and authority to *educate*, in the sense of forming the moral and religious character of our children.

So much for the difference between instruction and education. Reviewing the two pamphlets before us we are struck by a decided difference in form. The first is a masterly exposition not only as regards the clear and lucid arrangement of the subject matter, but also in the short, terse and complete statement of doctrine. Dr. Bouquillon considers three main questions, the right, mission and authority of education in regard to the family, the State and the Church. From this results a natural and delightfully plain division of the whole subject in three main sections (right, mission and authority), each with three subdivisions (family, State and Church). While a preliminary chapter treats of the right of educating in the individual, a fourth section, on "The Liberty of Education," closes the small but weighty work. In it the right and mission (special office), as also the authority, ("the right of watching over, controling and directing education," p. 21), are vindicated in favor of the parent, the State and the Church. "Each of these societies has its proper authority, the character and extent of which authority are indicated by the nature of the society itself" (p. 22). The author's principles and arguments, as applied to instruction, will in the main be accepted by all, if we except his opinion concerning the extent of State compulsion. For ourselves we readily grant the State full power and authority to promote secular knowledge, elementary and superior, as far as the needs of society demand; also the right to compel parents, *if need be*, to educate their children and to take the place of the parent in the fulfillment of this duty *in certain cases* (pg. 25). But we absolutely deny that it has the right "to determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory," and "to exact that minimum by way of prevention and of general precept" (p. 26); or that it has the right to examine the teachers (p. 24), and to prescribe a uniform method and standard for any schools not its own. But be-

fore stating our reasons we desire to quote a pertinent passage from the chapter on the authority of the Church in Education. Having first claimed for the Church the direct right over the religious and moral education of Catholic youths Dr. Bouquillon continues on p. 29: "As to the teaching of letters, sciences, arts, the Church has only an indirect authority over that, she can busy herself with it only in its relations to religion and morality. Schools, colleges and other like institutions are subject to the ecclesiastical authority, not only in religious teaching, but also in secular teaching, with this notable difference, however; that religious teaching comes directly and exclusively under her control, whereas secular teaching, which directly is under the control of the civil or domestic authority, depends on the Church only indirectly in the name of faith and morals. This comes to saying that the Church has the right to see to it that any teaching whatsoever do not injure faith, morals, the salvation of men, things of which she has the guardianship."

Père Holaind does not give us a closely reasoned essay. His pages supply us rather with notes and comments, embodying solid and grave doctrines, but jotted down, as is evident, under the high pressure of a few hours given to him to accomplish the work. A most valuable appendix containing passages from eminent writers on the subject makes up for any deficiency in the form of the preceding part. The main divisions answer to the questions of the right of education in the individual (§ 2), the parent (§ 3), the Church (§ 4), and the State (§§ 5-6). Referring to the practical question of the whole subject, the right of the State, Fr. Holaind, in a preliminary paragraph (p. 5), calls attention to a very important point in this connection, namely, whether the State of which we speak be Christian or Unchristian. He insists that the right to educate (in the stricter sense) may be allowed the "Christian State united with the Church, obedient to her in things spiritual, and (although itself supreme in the temporal order) acknowledging her indirect authority when she calls on rulers to come to her assistance."

No one denies to Society the right of having its own schools and teaching secular knowledge, simply because the State is unchristian or professes no religion. Everybody admits that in regard to secular instruction the State does have "its rights and duties from its own natural make-up, independently of its connection with supernatural religion." But the case is different when we speak of education in its truer sense. Dr. Bouquillon states this clearly enough when he says (p. 15): "It is plain that the right of the State in education

is not an unlimited right. The State, just as individuals or the family, cannot teach error and vice, *cannot set up schools that are atheistic or agnostic.*" Again, when he affirms that no pope has ever declared "that the State went beyond its right in founding schools, *provided the instruction be organized in the spirit of Christianity*" (p. 14). Or again, when he so truly observes: "In these days of religious indifference, in the presence of an education that is indifferent or hostile to religion, bishops found schools, colleges, academies, universities. Clearly this is a case of necessity, regrettable necessity, implying the regret that the State is indifferent to Christianity in the premises" (p. 20.). These are few but golden words.

The main portion of Fr. Holaind's pages and especially the appendix, are devoted to the question of compulsory education as regards the parent and the State. This constitutes, no doubt, the principal issue of the two pamphlets. On other points American Catholics hardly need any special enlightening; they are questions beyond controversy and sufficiently understood.

But what to most of them was probably new was the assertion that the State possessed an immediate right to force a general, and what has been called compulsory, education. Against this doctrine Fr. Holaind raises his voice in section 6, on State Control. Here, instead of pursuing the writer's arguments, we take leave to digress for a moment. No doubt the Church allows free scope of opinion on this matter of compulsory education. A Catholic may defend State compulsion as a direct right and as of general necessity, or he may deny both. Hence, while no one has the right to give ugly names to those who stand for the first opinion, it is equally unwarranted, if not unjust, to brand its opponents as men behind the age, opposed to civilization, and in fact, as blind zealots, injuring the very interests of the Church. We personally confess to being "stationary" in this matter, for all the arguments so far as they rest either on the merits of the case or on authority adduced in favor of general State compulsion, have not been able to convince us of the existence of such right. We hope to show in the next number of this REVIEW why these reasons have failed to convince us. For the present we rest content to endorse the reported saying of a most prominent Congressman, a Protestant, who, when spoken to on the subject, replied: "I would be very sorry to see the Catholics of America committed to the theory of compulsory education, when it is of the highest importance that every American should uphold individual rights and parental authority." Not to speak of the severer

forms of State compulsion, we cannot even allow the State *to compel all parents by a general law* to give to their children a certain minimum of secular instruction and to directly control such instruction.

In this grave question it is of primary importance, first, to remember the general principle of sound political economy, that the State or Government has no right to limit the natural liberty of its subjects, except in case of a real, social necessity. Mere utility is not a sufficient cause to use force or compulsion. In the second place we are to understand clearly by what title or on what ground the State may claim the right to compel parents to educate their children. The nature and object of a right is best explained by the reason of its existence. This reason is derived from the end of the civil authority. Now, as Dr. Bouquillon (p. 18) has very well said, "The purpose of civil authority is (1) to maintain peace between citizens, protect their mutual rights, their legitimate activity; (2) to supply the insufficiency of individuals." He then remarks that "The duty of teaching is not for the State an essential duty, it is accidental," corresponding to the secondary purpose of the State. From these premises we necessarily infer that this duty of the State to teach is not absolute, but conditional; it does not belong to the State primarily or directly, but only in the second place and by devolution. The State may therefore with the *free* co-operation of the citizens exercise it as far as it promotes the common good; but it can *enforce* instruction *only* when it is necessary to supply the deficiency of the parents. All this, indeed, follows from the very nature of our subject; it follows from the essential and immutable relation between the State and the family. By nature the child belongs to the family first, and only through and in the family to the State. By nature the duty and right not only to educate but also to instruct belong to the family. We say advisedly *the family*, not the parent only. For we hold it to be the intention of the natural order that when father and mother are unable to fulfill their duty towards their offspring, this devolves on the next of kin before it falls upon society. The idea of "child" is just as inseparable from that of "family" (agnati or cognati) as the idea of "State-ward" is incompatible with the latter. That the child should be a ward of the State, indicates an abnormal condition of the family or of society. Fr. Holaind rightly observes that "young orphans are at a disadvantage from the start, as keen observers of human nature well know. In political life, history tells the same tale." What we have thus far said leads to an

important conclusion, on which we desire to lay particular stress. It is this : *the State has no right to take hold of the child without showing cause,* as lawyers would say ; that is, without proving its right to interfere, or showing evidence that compulsion is necessary. In what are essential rights, the family stands on equal terms with the State. The *prima facie* right is with the family. So is the *prima facie* presumption for the family and can be set aside only by strong evidence. What is said of the family applies equally to the private schools to which the parents entrust their children.

But here we meet the objection: How can the State fulfil its duty of promoting the common interest without official inspection as to whether there be any deficiency in instruction, or without demanding, by way of prevention, at least *a minimum* in every school, private or public?

The answer is simple enough. The presumption being in favor of the family, the State has no right to take any such deficiency for granted; it has, therefore, no right to intrude by making inquiry into such deficiency until there be good cause to suspect its existence. If the foregoing objections were well grounded, it would only be logical to take a step farther and by the same inference claim for the State the right to send an "inspector" into every household to inquire whether parents fulfill their duty towards each child in its physical, intellectual and moral development. Why not prescribe for every family a uniform *minimum* of physical, intellectual and moral education? In a word, why not make of the State a supreme and universal bureau of detectives? In many lands the law gives to the State the right to take a child away from his parents, if they are proved to be of such character, that their offspring may not be safely entrusted to them. We certainly endorse such law. Yet we know of no law allowing official or State inspection and control of what passes within the family circle. Why not? Because everyone feels that the government has no right to intrude into those sacred precincts without showing good cause for doing so; because the law does not pretend to ferret out such cause, but will act only when it obtains public or official cognizance of the evil. These are plain axioms of public government and State rights. It cannot, therefore, be surprising that we should remonstrate against the assertion and inference that "if the State may coerce parents who neglect the education of their children, so also may it determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory," implying, as the words taken in the ordinary sense do, that the State has directly the right to con-

trol and inspect all schools. There is no logical connection between the former and the latter. We hold, therefore, as a matter of principle, that the government has no right to inspect or control private schools, or to examine its teachers, or to prescribe the order and method of teaching, *as long as it has no evidence* that the children in these schools do not acquire sufficient elementary knowledge to secure their social well being or that of their future fellow citizens. The duty of proving an insufficiency in this case rests with the State.

Before concluding our review we cannot refrain from making a few additional observations. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that the principles underlying the school question are being freely discussed by Catholic writers. We must not leave the field to the outsider. But it is regrettable to see Catholic papers conduct the discussion in a spirit of intemperate heat and prejudice. *In veritate et caritate.* The friends of State rights have nothing to fear from those who uphold family rights ; nor have the friends of the parochial schools any reason to deny to Cæsar what belongs to him. Many of the latter, we know, are greatly afraid that by admitting the theory of compulsory education, the State may eventually and justly claim that right in regard to Catholic parochial schools and interfere with their work. True, the State might thus *abuse* that right ; and the danger is near enough with us in the United States, where the government officially recognizes neither religion nor church. Is it not somewhat *inopportune* on the part of Catholics to vindicate for the State the right of compulsory education, while every careful observer of political events sees the time not very far off when our Government will claim that right loudly and forcibly enough? Still the question of right in general is never to be determined by the possible abuse of it. "This is bad reasoning," as Dr. Bouquillon rightly observes. General compulsory education and direct State control can be refuted by other arguments. But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the government have the fullest right of general compulsion in regard to education, *may it exercise that right in regard to schools, elementary or higher, established by the Church?*

We answer decidedly : no ; the State has no right whatever over the instruction, secular or religious, given in the schools belonging to the Church, we mean schools erected and managed under the immediate direction and by the authority of the Church, and which are, therefore, claimed by the Church as her own schools. The question is not about schools erected and managed by private individu-

als, although these may happen to be members of the Church. We speak principally of our Catholic parochial schools. As distinguished from the State schools on the one hand, and from mere private establishments on the other, our parochial schools are juridically or legally *ecclesiastical schools* and within the exclusive competency of the Church ; they belong to her, are hers by every right and title. Now the Church being a society both in its character and aim, superior to and independent of, the State, has the free and exclusive, the absolutely independent administration of whatever belongs to her.

Let none object that secular instruction does not lie within the scope of the Church's teaching, and cannot be claimed as her own ; that consequently the State may inspect and control the secular instruction, although it happen to be given in a Catholic or Church school.

The reasoning seems to us false *in asserto* and *in supposito*. The Church does have, and may therefore claim, a positive right to impart secular instruction to her own children at least. She has a right to whatever is necessary in order to carry out her great mission. Her special mission, it is true, is to give spiritual education, yet not to the poor, the lowly and the illiterate alone, but also to the rich, the high-born and the cultured. She is to teach the most sublime knowledge to every race and nation on earth, and to defend the truth of her doctrine. In discharging this mission she has to adapt herself to the condition, intellectual and moral, of the people whom she addresses. If, to support compulsory instruction in the State, it is said that instruction must keep pace with the march of civilization in society, it may be said with equal truth that the Church needs better trained and more fully instructed children as well as pastors and teachers, in proportion as the demands which civilized society makes upon her increase. As knowledge grows and develops among mankind in general, so it must grow and develop within the Church. The greater the progress of science is outside of the Church, the more assiduously must she labor to have men of ability and eminent learning within her fold. Without progress of secular science it would be difficult to imagine a real *scientific* progress of Christian knowledge. The Vatican Council, Const. I, ch. IV, aptly says: "Not only can faith and reason never be opposed to one another, but they are of mutual aid one to the other; for right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and illumined by its light cultivates the science of things divine. . . . So far, therefore, is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and

sciences that she in many ways helps and promotes it."[1] For no other reason has our illustrious Pontiff, Leo XIII., so emphatically proclaimed the necessity of renewed efforts on the part of Catholic men of science in the various departments of philosophy, classical studies, history and social science, but because the Church has need of such efforts amid the present intellectual crisis. We should go even farther and grant for the sake of argument that the Church does not have *per se* the right to impart secular knowledge to her children. Nevertheless, if once she has established such schools for the purpose of imparting moral education, together with intellectual instruction, she would, by right of accession, have exclusive authority over the secular training which she thus gives to the children under her control. This follows from the absolute independence of the Church as a perfect society and her superior position as regards the State.

What we have thus attempted to explain has been beautifully and elegantly summed up by Dr. Bouquillon in the following passage (p. 16): "The Church, having thus received *directly* from God the right to teach revealed religion, is thereby *indirectly* endowed with the right to teach the sciences and letters, in so far as they are necessary or useful to the knowledge and practice of revelation. The right to teach religion comprehends the right to communicate whatever may serve religious education. We do not say that the teaching of profane sciences and letters belongs to the Church by the same title that the teaching of religion does; much less do we say that such teaching belongs to her exclusively; what we do say is, that the right to spread the revelation entails the right to whatever is profitable to revelation. Now human sciences and letters are destined by God to be handmaidens of faith and of the chief among sciences, theology.—This right is a special right, proper to the Church, direct as to revelation, indirect as to other knowledge.—Moreover, if we consider the Church merely as a human association, we cannot refuse to her the natural right to teach the truths she is adapted and fitted to impart to men. Such right belongs, as we have seen, to associations." Dr. Bouquillon considers it as a self-evident truth that the Church has entire and exclusive control over her own schools. He dismisses the subject with the simple remark (p. 28): "It is not a question here of the authority of the Church over schools founded by her." What he observes in the above ex-

1 See the admirable words of *Leo XIII* in his Encyclical "Libertas," in the paragraph on the 'Freedom of Education.'

tract concerning the sciences and letters, applies more fully and strongly to primary instruction, on account of its inseparable connection with education.

As the question of the absolute independence of our parochial schools from State control is of paramount consequence, we may be allowed to quote at length from a foremost Catholic writer of the day. Cardinal *Zigliara* (l. c., l. i., c. v., a. 3, n. v.) establishes the thesis "*Ecclesia plenissima gaudet facultate docendi independenter a potestate civili.*" To be clearly understood, he observes at once that he does not speak of that general commission to teach all nations, but of the special right to erect schools (peculiariter de potestate aperiendi scholas). The Church, he argues, is not only a perfect society, but she moreover is above civil society, in fact the latter is subordinate to the former. Now, as the Church needs intellectual and moral instruction as well as society at large (which is the premise implied in the Cardinal's reasoning), she must in this respect enjoy the same full rights as the State, although independently from it. "*Sed insuper addo, Ecclesiae competere jus seligendi magistros, designandi scholas, praescribendi methodos et doctrinas suis subditis,* QUOD JUS STATUI DENEGAVIMUS" (46, ix. et. x). The Church, being essentially spiritual, has an essential duty to procure the perfection of her subjects in the development of both intellect and will. Hence the Church is essentially a teaching society (*societas doctrinalis*) . . . Infidels do not admit this, but their denial cannot destroy the truth, nor need the Church renounce her right, because her adversaries deny it. The Cardinal concludes this part by insisting again on the right of the Church to open and control schools of her own. Nor can it be objected, he claims, that this holds only in regard to theological science; for all truths are mutually connected, and there is no knowledge that has not some relation with Christian theology. Hence the Church enjoys an independent, an inherent and native right of teaching primarily and directly in matters of faith, secondarily and mediately in matters of natural science (magisterium scientiarum naturalium).

If then we were to define the Catholic position in regard to the question, To whom does education belong, to the State or to the Church? we should answer: Education as moral and religious instruction belongs to the Church exclusively. As to secular instruction, whether it be primary or of the higher grades, the State has the right to teach. This right is primary, direct and essential, in as much as it offers to the social activity of the individual all the requi-

site and useful means and opportunities within the limits of distributive justice and in due subordination to religion. So far as it implies the authority to compel and control, it is secondary, indirect and accidental. Moreover, this right of the State, as above defined, is supreme and independent within its own sphere. But it is not exclusive. The Church also has the right to impart secular knowledge, although with her the right is mediate and secondary, as a means to serve her immediate purpose, Christian instruction and the cultivation of virtue. Where the State furnishes the proper secular instruction, the Church need not use her own right, though she may; if she does, she is herein independent and supreme. But this right is not exclusive on the part of the Church, since the State enjoys the same. Neither has the Church an absolute right to compel anybody to learn secular knowledge in her schools rather than those of the State, if the latter pay due regard to Christian faith and morals. Nor may the State, on the other hand, prevent any subject from acquiring human learning in schools established by the Church. If the Church be allowed full and unrestricted liberty of education, the State need have no fear whatever that its subjects or society would thereby suffer the loss of any *real* good, or that the Church's action would retard the advance of social welfare, or the progress of civilization.

"*Quin imo ecclesia, quod re ipsa passim testata est . . . humanarum quoque doctrinarum omne genus favere et in majus provehere studet. Bona enim per se et laudabilis atque expetenda elegantia doctrinae: praetereaque omnis eruditio, quam sana ratio pepererit, quaeque rerum veritati respondeat, non mediocriter ad ea ipsa illustranda valet, quae Deo auctore credimus. Revera Ecclesiae haec beneficia debentur sane magna, quod praeclare monumenta sapientiae veteris conservarit; quod scientiarum domicilia passim aperuit; quod ingeniorum cursum semper incitaverit, studiosissime has ipsas artes colendo; quibus maxime urbanitas aetatis nostrae coloratur.*" (Leo xiii. l. c.)

S. G. MESSMER.

NOTE.—Since the printing of the above article Dr. Bouquillon has published a "Rejoinder to Critics." The reader will find our answer in this number. ED.

THE SCHOOL CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT is with extreme reluctance and against my better judgment that I take any part in a controversy which ought never to have been opened and which can serve the cause of God and religion only by choking itself as soon as possible. To me the whole discussion looks like a raging tempest in a very diminutive tea-pot. To be sure, we have heard some hard words bandied on either side. We have even been informed that "two antagonistic schools" are forming amongst us, the one "progressive" with its headquarters, I believe, in the far Northwest and its literary centre in Washington, the other "fogy" and "stationary," fossilizing about the Ordinary of New York or Milwaukee—I am not certain which, nor does it matter much, since the Jesuits are at the bottom of it.

I admit that in one direction, at least, there has been a "new departure." To those of the clergy who learned their notions of clerical and episcopal etiquette in the dignified school of a Kenrick or Wood or McCloskey (men who never appeared in public except in an official capacity), it certainly is novel and bewildering to be obliged at each instant to make distinctions between the eloquent utterances of Mr. Thomas Jones, American citizen, and the orthodox pastorals of the Right Rev. Thomas, Bishop of Jonesville. Now, mind, I am not finding fault at all. If any person in authority conceives it timely or necessary to doff his official robes and mount a stump, either in his shirt-sleeves or a swallow-tailed coat, that is no business of mine: *Miror magis*. But whoever appeals to Cæsar, to Cæsar must go, and by Cæsar's judgment abide. A great many soldiers are delighted when they see their commander brandish his shillalagh and plunge into the thickest of the fight, giving and receiving black eyes. Many others might prefer that he should take his stand upon some vantage-ground from which he could quietly survey and direct the operations of his host, without making his person a receptacle for dust and bullets.

After this enigmatical exordium, I have no insuperable objection to stating my "views" on the educational question, if the REVIEW deem them worth the printing.

1. The main question (and, indeed, so far as the priests can be made to take any interest in it, the *sole* question) is the important one of *expense*. In the words of a distinguished statesman: "It is a condition, not a theory, which confronts us." If the establishment and maintenance of our parochial schools did not involve the outlay of great sums of money, each dollar of which represents hard toil and copious

sweat on the part of pastor and people, who doubts that there would be a flourishing parochial school, under exclusively Catholic superintendence, attached to each of our churches? If the question be one of *rights*, has any one ever denied that we have the right to educate our Catholic children in our own schools and to see to it that their education be thoroughly saturated with Catholicism? As for the "minimum of education," has any priest been haggling about the amount to be imparted? It seems to me to be a point of honor with each of our priests to show forth his children more talented and better instructed than any children in the neighborhood, or in the wide universe. Oh that some inventive genius would strike upon an easy method of raising funds for the support of our schools! A pamphlet from him would be more valuable to us than a cart-load of abstruse speculations.

2. I presume that the vast majority of my brother priests have as vague a notion as I must confess to, regarding the exact meaning of the phrase "State education, *as such*." But we all have, to our cost, an intimate familiarity with the "trend" and signification of "State-education, *as it is*," and as it is going to remain during the span of our mortal existence. Since busy men are not wont to coalesce into "antagonistic schools" over subjects which are not, and in all human possibility never will be, of practical importance to them, let us, first of all, ask whether there is on this wide continent a reputable priest who is willing to defend, as correct in principle, the only form of State-education which has been offered us. But let the same man write the theoretical and the practical part of the disquisition, for it is clearly unfair both to the moralist and to his readers that one man should discourse in abstract terms about mythical "States" which nowhere exist outside of his imagination, and that a brilliant commentator should make those abstractions intensely concrete by applying them as satisfactory solutions of existing difficulties. The only "State education" which concerns us is the actual public school system of this country. It is of the essence of this system, however it be modified, carefully to eliminate from its curriculum every vestige of Christian doctrine. It forces Christian children to be virtually un-Christian and "colorless in religion" during the six hours of each school-day. Will any Catholic undertake to advocate this *as a system*? We are not asking whether a Catholic under given circumstances, can *tolerate* it. Since the question is one of "inalienable rights," let us know by what right the "State" presumes to force innocent little Christians at certain

intermittent periods to become non-Christians and little Catholics to become non-Catholics, as the price of this inestimable boon of State-education. It will be said, of course, that I am fighting imaginary foes; that no Catholic ever approved, or ever will approve, this feature of the public school system. But it is precisely this which I am aiming to show and to bring out in relief. If then it is agreed among all Catholics, first, that we have a perfect right to establish, maintain and superintend our own parochial schools and, secondly, that the "State" has absolutely no right to thrust upon us a system of education which eliminates the all-important element of religious instruction, what becomes of those two mythical schools of the "Progressists" and the "Fogies?"

3. Brushing aside this irrelevant lore about "abstractions," let us, since we agree in our principles, come down to the practical *quaeritur*. Suppose that a priest is so circumstanced (and, unfortunately, I am one of them) that in his judgment and the judgment of his Ordinary it would be imprudent for him to shoulder the burden of a parochial school. Why, he will do the next best thing, which is, however, infinitely inferior to the only desirable thing. He will, in theory, gather his children together very frequently outside of those sacred six hours a day which the wisdom of the "State" has consecrated to "unsectarianism." In cold reality, he will meet them little oftener than once a week for an hour of a Sunday afternoon.

4. This brings us, at last, to consider the so-called "plans." Now, there is all the difference in the world between a *system* and a *plan*. A system is the rational and logical evolution of assumed principles; a plan is the expedient by which a man makes the best he can of circumstances not of his creating. The American "State," inspired by the laudable desire to secure the education of the masses, and by the reprehensible wish to accomplish the thorough fraternization of the population at the sacrifice of religious differences, founded the "unsectarian" school system, which is, confessedly, most admirably adapted to effect both the good and the evil purpose. The Catholic Church, just as desirous as the "State" that her little ones should receive the benefits of education, and equally determined that this should not be done at the expense of their Catholic faith, in her dissatisfaction with the State-system, founded the parochial school. Here are two rival *systems*, which are perfectly rational from start to finish. As I stated above, not a Catholic in the land would attempt to reconcile the unreconcilable, were he not put to his wit's end by financial embarrassment. But that same distress which prevents me from

building a parochial school suggested to my very dear and honored friend, Dr. McSweeney, the half-way measures known as the Poughkeepsie Plan. I do not presume to represent his sentiments, for he is well able to represent himself. But I state a notorious fact when I say that the Doctor did not inaugurate the plan with a loud flourish of trumpets. He scattered no literature broadcast over the land. He did not interview himself in newspapers. He is, indeed, the typical propagandist; but he undertook no propagandism in other parishes of an expedient suggested to his superior intellect by the immediate necessities of his own congregation. When his Bishop rewarded his sacerdotal labors by transferring him to a larger and wealthier parish, he did not introduce his "plan" into his new field. I must really beg his pardon for taking such freedom with his name; but I wish to show that the ingenious inventor of an excellent expedient was no idle theorist, but a practical American priest. I only wish that our Philadelphia Board of Education were made up of gentlemen as large-minded as were those gentlemen of Poughkeepsie who blushed to educate their own children with money extorted from poor Catholic laborers. I wish, further, that my people were in the condition of the Doctor's congregation of St. Bridgid in New York, that is, able to pay an iniquitous tax in support of a system which is of no earthly use to them, whilst they maintain, in addition, a school which accords with their conscientious convictions.

I have written condensedly, for I have been addressing intelligent men. The outcome of this lamentable discussion, so inadvertently opened, can only be to unnerve and discourage those noble priests and brave congregations that have been battling against fearful odds and deserved better treatment in the house of their friends; and to afford to irresolute priests and to people chafing under a double taxation a specious pretext for relinquishing the struggle. All of which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES F. LOUGHLIN.

THE "REJOINDER TO CRITICS."

Education: To Whom Does It Belong?—A Rejoinder to Critics. By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D. D., Professor of Moral Theology at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

DR. BOUQUILLON has found it necessary to explain the statement of principles made in his recent pamphlet "Education: To Whom Does It Belong?" The fact that he had meant to treat only the theoretical aspect of the question, did not prevent an immediate application on the part of those who had reason to defend or approve the so-called "Faribault-plan," whilst experienced Catholic educators, who had the matter at heart, rose at once to protest against Dr. Bouquillon's exposition. The criticisms evoked from temperate men, who were at the same time practical educators, have therefore proved our previous assertion that the pamphlet bore "in the light of existing facts" an aggressive character, whatever may have been the intention of the writer to the contrary. Dr. Bouquillon takes exception to this statement, and asks: "Those existing facts—are they mine?" We should answer, certainly no. But they were existing nevertheless. One might very safely demonstrate the harmlessness of nitro-glycerine absorbed in some compact substance, by setting fire to it. It would burn quietly and make a fine light. Yet it were the height of folly to attempt such demonstration with the same substance in a position where the slightest touch might send it down an inclined board, and cause a concussion with the hard ground. The principle of harmless ignition would suffer nothing, but the disruptive force set free by the attempted demonstration under the circumstances would endanger the lives of those within reach.

Dr. Bouquillon believes that our criticism was "not fair" and intimates that in it we have followed the *procès de tendence*. This is an objection difficult to refute. We confess to a bias; but then it came largely from Dr. B's pamphlet and from the recollection of a similar method pursued in a work recently condemned by the S. Congregation, which, as is well enough known, was looked on favorably by the same authorities that have inspired the pamphlet on education. But our criticism was, we had hoped, very temperate. Some of our readers, strangers to us in a way, even found fault with us for "temporizing" in a matter of such importance. If we were more moderate than inclination suggested, it was because we dis-

tinctly recollected the works of Dr. Bouquillon, which he had written in France, and which are so full of erudition and value to the student that we found nothing but praise for them. Nevertheless, we knew that an able author's views might change or be modified without making it incumbent upon him to retract previously stated principles. Nor are we alone in this estimate of Dr. B.'s latest work. A prominent critic in Europe, who read this pamphlet, and who is quite familiar with American conditions, having lived here as an educator for many years, exclaims: *O quantum mutatus ab illo!*

However, it is futile for us to attempt a defense against the charge of being biased by simply stating that we are not. We anticipated the charge, and have made the only answer which we could make with consistency and possible satisfaction to Dr. Bouquillon. It is this: We invited some gentlemen of experience as educators and of acknowledged authority to review the pamphlet. In doing this we have tried to guard against every probable charge as if we were fostering a partisan view. We have asked those who would be apt to view the subject from different stand-points. We excluded the Jesuits. We excluded foreigners, although the loudest champions of State-control in education are, we believe, themselves foreign-born citizens. Dr. Messmer was urged to write, because he was best qualified, we thought, to present the theme on equal grounds of authority with Dr. Bouquillon, since he has not taken part in any controverty of the kind heretofore, and is at the same time a friend and fellow professor at the Catholic University. Being an acknowledged expert in Civil as in Canon Law, no one would be likely to take into more accurate account the different elements of our civil and religious legislation. Moreover, he is a practical schoolman, thoroughly americanized, as they say, and a lover of peace like Dr. Bouquillon. We did not know whether the writers of this projected symposium would agree on the details of the school question; but we knew that they were Catholics, learned, and interested in the practical welfare of Catholic citizens. Dr. Loughlin's plea has, like his style, a peculiar force of its own. He takes the standpoint of a priest who cannot see his way to supporting a Parochial school and who would therefore readily welcome any offer of State assistance, which does not imply a sacrifice of conscientious principle in the shape of undefined State-control whereby the religious training of our little ones must or may suffer. He points out that the originator of the so-called Poughkeepsie plan was very far from intending it as a model-system, but simply adopted it as

the most favorable compromise under difficult circumstances. We beg the reader to give careful thought to the three papers of the symposium. The fourth article on the position of Catholics in regard to education in Great Britain shows merely what those think on the subject who have been taught by experience under State-control in its various phases. American citizens have enjoyed an unequalled liberty, simply because they had few laws which they had occasion to violate. No Catholic at present objects to having his children educated, but many object to having the State interfere with their religion, which will surely be done if we give the State the supreme right of controlling the education of our children.

Our answer, therefore, as a Reviewer, to Dr. Bouquillon, is to refer him to the arguments of men who are above the suspicion of personal prejudice. They all speak with deep respect of the author, who is very much superior to the reasoning shown in his latest pamphlet. Of the latter we have still a word to say apart from any criticism which previously appeared in our Review. It merely illustrates the weakness of principles when the logic of their meaning is ignored.

In repelling the charge of having misapplied certain quotations from reputable authors, Dr. Bouquillon places a dilemma before his critics. "*Evidently*," he says, "some one does not know how to read or is lying to the public. That some one is either Fr. E. A. Higgins, S. J., or Dr. Bouquillon. As no one is a judge in his own case, I produce the documents and appeal to the public. Let its verdict be Fr. Higgins' punishment or mine."

Now, this is exceedingly strong language, and it almost takes one's breath away when, on comparing the proffered documents with the words of Fr. Higgins, the public must come to the conclusion that the hurtful horn of the dilemma actually lifts Dr. Bouquillon off his ground and leaves Fr. Higgins serenely master of the field. Here are the texts:

Father Higgins states that not one of the authorities (quoted by Dr. Bouquillon) "gives to the State the right of education as he has formulated it, that is, the right to establish schools, pay teachers, *prescribe programmes*" (italics ours).

Dr. B. answers: "Here are the documents." And then he cites passages from Costa Rossetti, Hammerstein, Sauvé and Zigliara. As they all say practically the same thing, and Cardinal Zigliara would for several reasons be the least objectionable authority from Dr. B.'s point of view, we quote his words: "Statui jus simul et

officium inesse procurandi *media aptiora ad educationem* tum intellectualem tum moralem, negat profecto nemo." That is to say, the State has the right and duty to provide the most suitable means for the intellectual and moral education of its subjects. Surely no one gainsays this. We Catholics are constantly insisting on it when we claim that the taxes paid by Catholics for purposes of education be used to supply them with proper means, such as school-houses and salaries for teachers and inspectors, to that end. We only want an equivalent whereby our children may be benefited. Is there any philosopher who maintains that this phrase "the State has the right to *provide means*" implies that the State may *prescribe programmes*. "To prescribe programmes" includes anything that a Russian despot might exact from his subjects. Can the men who advocate such principles forget that the State laws which proscribed the Catholic faith and even a knowledge of the mother tongue in Ireland, and which are the cause of their very plea for more education among the immigrants, were the laws of Elizabeth which "prescribed a programme" for Irish schools? It is very true that "prescribing programmes" *may* mean nothing more than exacting the rudiments of a literary education, but it *may* mean a *great deal more* as it does even now in Minnesota where the religious teachers might at any moment be forced out of the schools at the mere representation of a bigoted parent, that the religious dress inspires his child with prejudices in favor of Romanism.

Who is to give us the power of drawing limits when once we have committed ourselves to the civil system which allows politicians to make and enforce programmes for teaching our children without regard to their religion, because the non-Catholic voters are perchance in a majority!

This, surely, is reason, and we urge it without any slightest personal animosity, simply because those who seem to take nothing into consideration but present and apparent advantages, urge the contrary and urge it openly, identifying their name with a principle always dangerous, but particularly so just now.

THE EDITOR.

STATE CONTROL OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The following paper points an important lesson in regard to State control where it limits the freedom of religious education. In most European countries under non-Catholic governments necessity has forced Catholics to accept a compromise, which is, however, opposed to their sense of equity as free citizens. Hence, whilst they tolerate what it is out of their power to change, they make nevertheless every legitimate effort to secure the freedom of religious education to which they are justly entitled. It must seem strange to our Catholic brethren abroad that in the face of such facts there should exist in the United States a party calling itself Catholic which invites the very bondage (and indeed one far more dangerous and degrading, under our State system, than it is anywhere in Europe) from which Catholics everywhere in the world are striving to free themselves.

The article here refers specially to Catholic Elementary Schools in England and Wales, and is written by an experienced schoolman.

ED.

SCOTLAND has had since 1696 a legalized system of national elementary education. By law, each parish was provided with a primary school at the expense of the landowners or heritors, who had to maintain it and provide the teacher with certain emoluments, though he was also allowed to charge a small fee for each pupil. Ireland, too, has had a system of (so-called) national primary education since 1831; but, as it is an undenominational system thrust upon a people who desire denominational schools, it is not a great success from an educational point of view. I believe, however, that it has to some extent attained the object of its promoters in raising up a generation of Catholics not so distinguished as were their fathers for simple faith and affectionate devotion to their pastors.

Unlike Scotland and Ireland, England had not, and hardly has still, any national system of primary education. The first Parliamentary grant for elementary education in England and Wales was made in 1833. Before this time the schools for the working classes had been carried on entirely by voluntary efforts. Two extensive organizations were then in existence—the National Society for the Education of the Children of the Poor in connection with the Established Church, and the Home and Foreign Society for the children of others not so connected. The first grants voted by Parliament were devoted entirely to purposes of building or enlarging schools, and the appropriation of them was intrusted to the two societies before mentioned by the Committee of the Privy Council on Education.

Up to the year 1846 all Parliamentary grants were used for building purposes; but in this year the "Pupil Teacher System" was introduced from Holland, and the stipend of the pupil teacher, as well as certain gratuities to the head teacher for the extra lessons given, were both paid by the Committee of Council on Education.

In 1847 the Catholics of England and Wales were aroused to the importance of their claiming a share in the State aid given to elementary schools. The Vicars-Apostolic now determined to create a committee consisting partly of ecclesiastics and partly of laymen, whose business it should be to keep themselves informed of whatever was going on in Parliament on the subject of popular education, and to take steps to secure for Catholics such share of State aid as they were justly entitled to. This committee, so formed by the Bishops of England, and afterwards joined by the Bishops of Scotland, is still in existence. It is now called "The Catholic School Committee," and it represents, in matters which concern elementary education, the Catholic dioceses of Great Britain, having one clerical and two lay members for each diocese. In this representation it is recognized by the Government. On the 18th of December, 1847, a minute was passed by the Committee of Council on Education accepting the Poor School Committee, as it was then called, as the ordinary channel of communication between themselves and the Catholic body. The late Hon. Charles Langdale was the first chairman of the Catholic Poor School Committee, and in 1848 Mr. T. W. Marshall was appointed by the Privy Council as the first Catholic Inspector of Schools.

Until 1870 the Government never took the initiative in promoting education. It only gave grants to those that did, no matter who they were or to what denomination they belonged, provided always that they could show they were working out satisfactory results, as tested by government inspectors. These grants in aid were (1) for building; (2) for maintaining schools; (3) capitation grants of so much per head for each scholar whose proficiency satisfied the school inspectors.

Before the year 1870 all the State-aided schools were strictly denominational. Our schools were then thoroughly Catholic; not only taught by Catholic teachers, but also inspected by Catholic government inspectors nominated by the representatives of the Bishops. Then the dogmatic teaching of the Church and the pious practices of our Holy Religion could not be banished for a single minute from our schools. We are told that this Denominational System was a

failure because under it about two-thirds of the children of the country were not on the rolls of any school, and that secular Board schools should be established to educate these "gutter children." I am sorry to find intelligent Catholics even now admitting the failure of the Denominational System and recognizing the necessity of the Board School System. If there were so many children not attending school, it should be remembered that there was no power to compel attendance in those days. I most emphatically deny that the Denominational System was a failure. It never had a fair chance. It was starved out of existence. The voluntary efforts of the religious denominations were miserably seconded by shabby and niggardly grants from the State. The total government grant in 1870 was £903,978, whereas in 1890 it had risen to £3,678,540.

Lest it should be thought that this increase of grant is entirely owing to increase of attendance, I may mention that the grant *per head* on the average attendance in 1870 was 9s. 9¼d, while in 1890 it almost reached 17s. 10¾d. In addition to these augmented grants from the Government, the board schools receive several millions of pounds annually from the local rates which contribute nothing towards the maintenance of the voluntary schools.

However, in 1870 a radical change was made by the passing of an Education Act (33 Vict. c. 75) generally known as Mr. Forster's Act. This Act deprived State-aided schools under voluntary management of their purely denominational character by its conscience clause, which provides that children of any religion or no religion shall have the right of admission to any school; that there shall be two hours purely secular instruction each time the school meets; and that the time or times during which any religious observance is practiced, or instruction in religious subjects is given at any meeting of the school, shall be either at the beginning or at the end, or at the beginning and end of such meeting, and that any scholar may be withdrawn by his parents from any religious observance or instruction without forfeiting any of the other benefits of the school. Mr. Forster's Act established a system of school boards in England and Wales. It gave to each board the power to frame by-laws compelling the attendance of all children from five to thirteen years of age within the school district. It enacted that there should be provided by the school boards out of the local rates a sufficient number of public elementary schools for each school-district, available for all children residing in that district for whose elementary education suitable provision is not otherwise (that is, by voluntary

schools) made. The general expenses connected with managing these schools also must come off local rates. Existing schools were to receive Government aid (but no share of the local rates) on condition that the buildings and apparatus were suitable, that they were taught by duly qualified teachers, that the secular education they gave reached a certain standard of efficiency, that they submitted themselves to the examination of an undenominational inspector, and that they admitted the conscience clause as part of their regulations. In districts where the school accommodation is sufficient and the schools efficient, the rate-payers may or may not elect a school board, as they please, and, consequently, there were districts in which there was no provision for compulsory attendance. But in 1876 it was enacted that in such districts the town council or the guardians of the poor should appoint a school attendance committee and the compulsory powers possessed by the school boards were extended to these school attendance committees and thus compulsion has become universal. The Act of 1876 also extended the school age from thirteen years to fourteen years. Last year (1891) an act was passed under which an additional grant of ten shillings per head is offered to every school. All schools that accept this grant must make a reduction of ten shillings a head per annum in the amount of school fees which they charge. As the amount of fees raised annually by a large proportion of the schools is less than ten shillings a head, all these schools, if they accept the fee grant, become absolutely free, and they must always remain free schools. In the majority of the remaining schools also the fees will be very considerably reduced. The average rate of fees for 1890 came to but fourteen shillings a head. It will therefore be seen that in England elementary education will, in the future, be practically free and compulsory.

The Act of 1870 is a compromise between religion, as represented by the voluntary schools, and freethought, as represented by the board schools. Owing to our poverty and to the fact that we are but a small minority in the country, we Catholics are reluctantly obliged to accept the compromise.

The non-conformists, who form the backbone of the great Liberal Party, are the champions of the board school system, and they show no sign of wishing to abide permanently by the compromise. On the contrary, they have set their hearts upon making the board system the national system of education. The two systems are now running alongside each other; but the Church of England shows

signs of weariness in the unequal race, being now surpassed in examination results by the board schools, and having already given over many of her schools to the school boards. Our Catholic schools for the past twenty years have kept ahead of the board schools with their unlimited resources. These schools are now abreast with us. Shall we let them pass us? If the board schools surpass the voluntary schools to any very considerable extent in secular efficiency, the doom of the voluntary school system will be sealed. It is then our duty as Catholics to contribute generously to the support of our schools until by a change in the law, we can secure the share of the local rates to which we are justly entitled.

J. MURRAY.

SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY.

(*Second Article*).

Any theory which endeavors to explain the essential constitution of bodies and to define the nature of those ultimate principles out of which bodies are formed, upon the assumption that matter is extended and continuous, must face the great problem which is at the foundation of all these questions.

This is, how to maintain matter to be extended, or in other words, to be a continuous quantity, and at the same time, to get over the unavoidable difficulty of its divisibility *ad infinitum*.

Do what you list, you are in a dilemma. If you admit matter to be extended, you come to acknowledge that it is made up of parts. Now, these parts are either extended or not. If they are extended, they must in their turn be composed of parts which, if extended, are also resolvable into other parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. This endless divisibility and its absurd consequence, the imposition of an infinite number, seems to be the necessary result of any theory holding matter to be a continuous quantity.

To get over this difficulty, which many philosophers have considered unanswerable, the system of Dynamism has been invented. This maintains that what we call a body, as it is in nature, is composed of a number of substances, which are the elements we are seeking for. That these substances are unextended and really simple, hence absolutely devoid of parts. These simple points which may be called atoms are active. One may ask in the first place,

How do these simple unextended points form a body? They answer, By the force of attraction and repulsion interior to the atoms. The first draws them together so as to form an approach; the second keeps them at a sufficient distance, so that the approach may not become a contact.

The second question is, How do these simple points grouped together by the internal forces of attraction and repulsion cause the phenomenon so familiar to our senses, that of extension and resistance?

They reply that the extension and continuity which appears to our sense is only phenomenal and need not be real; for they maintain that it is not essential to the idea of existence, even material, to be extended and continuous.

It is sufficient that a corporeal element, obeying instinctively and unconsciously dynamic laws, occupy at each given instant a certain definite position in space either absolute or relative to other elements equally localized. That is to say it suffices, if it find itself at certain distances from others and if these change, that it transport itself from one place to another to place itself in adjusted relation with the others.

By maintaining such unextended atoms kept at a distance by forces such as that of attraction and repulsion, one may have bodies endowed with as much resistance as is necessary to account for our observation and experience of the phenomenon.

By locating these atoms in different ways in respect to others we can explain all the polyhedric figures which are observed by Chrystallography.

This system is held to-day by the most eminent metaphysicians and mathematicians who do not follow the scholastic theory.

But even a cursory examination of its main points will make it evident to our readers that it is utterly untenable.

In the first place, it not only does away with real extension, which its upholders concede, but it renders impossible even the idea and concept of phenomenal quantity, which, according to them, consists in a representation of extension arising from the impressions made on our senses, by the simple bodies acting at a distance from each other.

But this cannot be; since as extension cannot be conceived without continuity, neither can the phenomenon of extension be produced without the appearance of continuity. Now it is utterly impossible to have the phenomenon of continuity from unextended

points. For suppose these simple bodies to touch each other, what is the consequence? Evidently they must be forced, so to speak, into one ; since there can be no impenetrability between two simple bodies for the reason that such bodies either touch each other with the totality of their being or not at all. How otherwise could they come in contact with each other? By placing surface against surface? But there is no surface, where there are no parts.

But allow that they do not come in contact but keep at a distance from each other. In such a case, as the parts which compose the whole body are not extended, neither can the body which results from them be extended.

Whether, therefore, the simple bodies touch each other or whether they keep at a distance, they cannot offer any foundation for the phenomenon of continuity and hence for that of extension.

One can easily understand how that is produced in spite of the porosity of bodies ; how the surface of a body may appear to be continual in spite of the real breaks which exist on it. This is because, first, the little interstices or pores escape the perception of our senses, and because the ultimate parts are, after all, really welded together.

But in no possible way can we conceive how a number of unextended simple points, which are absolutely devoid of continuity, either singly or united, can yield the slightest foundation for the appearance of continuity.

Dynamism, then, cannot be accepted, because it is contrary and in utter variance with the observation of our senses, which perceive the phenomenon of continuity and extension, which perception it absolutely fails to explain.

But it is contrary also to metaphysical principles. It must necessarily suppose for the sake of theory that there can be such a thing as *action at a distance*. It is a fundamental principle of the system that the atoms or simple substances which compose the body are not in contact with each other, but mutually attract and repel each other. When their tendency is to go too far away from each other then the force of attraction comes into play, not to let them wander too far off; when their tendency is to draw them too near each other the law of repulsion asserts itself to maintain them at a respectful distance. It is evident, therefore, that though at a distance they act upon each other, or that the system supposes the possibility of action at a distance.

Now, such action is impossible. For an agent cannot act except

where it is, or where its influence reaches. But, in the case supposed, neither can take place, because a simple being cannot be in another, which is separated from it, nor can it reach it for want of a medium which may act as a vehicle of the movement, or as a bond of communication between the agent and the object acted upon. And truly, as it implies a contradiction that a cause should act without being endowed with activity, so it is contradictory to suppose that its activity should have any effect without being applied to the subject which is to be the term of its action. This is the more so as the action we are speaking of belongs to those acts which are called transient. A transient act is a movement which arises in an agent and which terminates in the object acted upon. If both the agent and the object are in immediate contact, such as, for instance, the soul and body in man, then we can conceive how a movement arising in one can find lodgement in the other. But if they are separate from each other, if they are at a distance, if no medium of communication exists between them, how can the movement of one be transmitted to the other and find its termination therein? Action at a distance, therefore, is not possible.

Dynamists have an answer to this argument, and it is but fair to examine it. We will let one of the best exponents of the system develop it in his own words:

"Phenomena which in the last analysis can be reduced to movement are essentially in space. They could not exist unless they existed in some place. Can we say the same of the substances which produce those phenomena? Perhaps the question has never occurred to those who look upon the principle that bodies can act only where they are, as indubitable. It is nevertheless sufficient to carefully examine it to cause the celebrated difficulty to vanish.

"It is certain that there exists in our spirit a necessary relation between space and those substances. We know them but as causes and could not conceive their effect except in supposing them to be in a definite place. It is for the same reasons that they have a necessary relation to time. By their action they are necessarily in time; that is, it is impossible that they could act except in time, their activity being unable to develop itself except by a continual series of successive phases which produce their phenomena. But if we try by means of abstraction to consider them in themselves and outside of and in opposition to their action, so to speak, and then to place them in time and to extend their existence therein, we should be denying their permanent identity and reduce them to distinct

things. This would eliminate from them everything which gives them their definite character. We must say of space what we have said of time.

"A material substance acts here or there, and to such an extent, but if we were to isolate it from its action, that is from all which attaches it to space we could no longer say that it is here or there nor attribute to it any dimension. Thus isolated from its effect the cause may or may not be, it may be a free or a necessary cause; but to continue in this isolation to so surround its essence with the geometrical attributes which characterize its effect is like combining in our imagination the different elements of a chimera. It is in space by its action; it is not there by its essence. And yet it should be in both senses in space in order to apply to it the principle which affirms the metaphysical absurdity of the action at a distance. For what can be meant by a distance between two things one of which is conceived to be in space, and the other is excluded from the same? We might as well speak of the distance between the centre of a circle and a theorem of geometry. The answer then concedes that the simple substances are not in space as to their essence, but they are in it by their action."[1]

The answer would be very ingenious if Dynamists admitted space to be something material and really extended. In that case it is true that between space and a simple substance we could not expect a contact of quantity but of action. A contact of quantity, which consists in the fact that two objects touch each other in such a manner that each part of one object touches the corresponding parts of the other, is possible only between two beings having real extension and made up of parts. But it is not conceivable between a composite being and a simple substance. In this case the latter having no parts cannot of course touch the parts of the other. Hence this contact between them can only exist as much as one acts upon the other. This is the contact which the above author claims for his atoms or simple substances and believes that he has removed the difficulty of the action at a distance. The essence, he maintains, of those substances exists in itself; its action is in space; where then is the distance?

But even in the case of a simple being acting on a composite being the presence of the essence and substance of the being must be where the action is and where it extends. What is the action of being? It is a movement of the being. Is it, and can it be,

1. Carbonelle, Les confins de la Science et de la Philosophie. Vol. I, p. 201.

separated from the being so that the being can exist in one place and the action can be in another? Evidently not, any more than a modification can be separated and have a distinct and independent existence from the subject on which it leans, and which it modifies.

It is absurd therefore for the Dynamists to say that the essence of their simple substances can be in itself and their actions in space. The two can be distinct but never separated and the second cannot be where the other is not.

But the fact of the matter is that in the Dynamic system neither space or extension or distance are conceivable. And the effort which its upholders make in explaining away the objection about the impossibility of the action at a distance puts this truth in its clearest light and boldest relief. Pray what is meant by real space except real extension; and what is real extension except a body formed of a number of parts, one outside the other but contiguous to and touching each other, and what is distance except that amount of real extension existing between two bodies?

With your simple substances which are nothing but geometrical points you abolish all continuity and therefore you do away with all ideas of extension, space and distance. "Imagine," says H. Martin, "a simple and single force and suppose it to be an unextended substance. This simple force not being extended cannot occupy any space. Its only possible presence is then that of action. Now, in order that an action be directed upon a determinate place, it is necessary that this place be determined independently of that action by the corporal presence of a real extension either in the same place or in another. But in the given hypothesis there is no possible real extension but only absolute and indefinite space. Hence that simple and single force cannot be in any place; its existence cannot introduce any definiteness and determination in the indefinite space. The same will happen to the second monad as happened to the first and exactly as if the first did not exist. Hence the second monad cannot enter into any relation with the first either as to space or distance. In fact distance supposes a unit of extension which has real dimensions because distance cannot be determined except by means of its relation to one of the dimensions of extension. Now in the hypothesis of dynamism there is no real extension, no unit of extension and of distance in space, no point of reciprocal location."[1]

1. H. Martin, Philosophie Spiritualiste de la Nature. Vol. 1 part 2 Ch. 14, page 360.

The Peripatetic System.

Neither the atomistic, nor the chemico-atomistic, nor the dynamic system answer the problem of the essential construction of bodies. Let us see if the scholastic theory does it with any better success. But before giving an accurate explanation of it we wish to premise a few words of Leibnitz. "We, too, have applied, and that not merely in a perfunctory manner, to the study of mathematics, mechanics and experimental philosophy; and though it must be confessed that in the beginning *we inclined to the very opinions to which we have just alluded, yet we have been compelled by the progress of study to return to the principles of the old philosophy.* And, perhaps, were it permitted to explain the course of our researches, there is no one except those who are pre-engaged by the prejudices of their imagination, who would not admit that these ideas are not of that confused and absurd character which is commonly attributed to them, by those who despise the received doctrines, and who scoff at Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and other illustrious men, as though they were but children in philosophy."[1] And again: "It seems that since some time the name of substantial forms has become infamous with some people, and who are ashamed to speak of them. In this, however, there is more of fashion than of reason."[2] It is clear that at the time of Leibnitz the opponents of the scholastic theory were only superficial minds, and those who cried it down did so more to follow the fashion than the dictates of reason. The same may be said of its enemies at the present day. Science is the fashion, and a blind faith not only in the true, well ascertained results of the same, but in all the pretensions and clamors which it raises, in all the extravagant demands it makes on the easy credulity of ignorant or superficial readers. We maintain that the scholastic system, when properly and sufficiently understood, is the only possible solution of the problem of the essential constitution of bodies. We will try our best to state it here at proper length and in the clearest possible manner, so that our readers may easily grasp the main fundamental points of the system, before we proceed to develop the reasons on which it rests.

The scholastic system, then, is the system of those philosophers, who, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and the Fathers, endeavored to investigate the essential constitution of bodies *by unit-*

1 Systema Theologicum, translated by Dr. Russell. London, 1850. Page 112.
2 Nouveaux Essais. Lib. 3, ch. 6.

ing reason with observation, arriving at the conclusion that a body is the result of two principles, one passive and the other active. The first they called *matter*, the second they called *form*. Hence the system of Matter and Form. You may ask, How did they reach such conclusions? By the following process. First of all they stated the question at hand most accurately, a thing which modern scientists do not always do. They distinguished in the composition of bodies the general and universal causes from the particular ones. And this they did most wisely. Because a material thing may be considered under two different aspects, in general and in particular, that is, as a body in general or as a particular body. Iron, for instance, if regarded in general, is a body, just the same as gold, lead, bronze, and such-like; but if it be considered as having all those requisites by which it is known by everyone as iron and distinguished from gold, silver, bronze, and other substances, it is a particular body. From this it is evident that if I am asked, What are the causes of the composition of bodies? I cannot answer by giving a single reply. I must inquire in turn, What do you wish to know, the intrinsic universal causes which form a body in general, or do you ask what are the causes which form such a body and no other?

The internal, universal causes which enter into the formation and constitution of a body in general, and which apply to all bodies, without exception, were called by the schoolmen *Principles*.

The particular causes which make a body as distinct from others were styled *Elements*; and they maintained that these elements were the product of principles, and not vice versa, the principles, the product of the elements.

You may inquire, How did they explain these two things, *principles* and *elements?* A principle is that from which a thing originates, in any way whatever. A cause is that from which a thing is produced or receives its being. Hence in ontology we are told that a principle has a wider application than a cause. The first implies a general idea of origin; the second conveys the specific concept of the same origin.

By elements the schoolmen understood those last things into which a particular body can be divided, hence they regarded three essential conditions in an element. 1st, That it must be the first to enter into the composition of that body; 2d, That it be always contained in the body of which it is the element, at least virtually; 3d, That it be the last thing found in the body when analyzed.

Take, for instance, hydrogen and oxygen, the two elements of which water is formed. It is evident that nothing is found in the water before those elements; they are always to be found in the same, at least virtually, no matter what alteration may be made in the water, and they are the last elements into which the water may be divided when analyzed.

A few corollaries of the utmost importance result from the above doctrine.

1st, That both the principles and the elements are intrinsical causes of the body. The first, the internal universal causes, since from them results the common nature of all bodies. The second, the particular causes, because to them is owing the special nature of every particular body.

The second corollary is, that when the schoolmen raise the problem as to the essential constitution of bodies, they do not mean to inquire what are the particular causes which constitute this or that body, but what are the universal principles which constitute a body in general, and are as such applicable not to any particular body, but to all bodies. They ask what are the essential principles of bodies, not what are the elements forming this or that body. The last question they leave to experimental sciences. The first they claim as within the province of metaphysicians. The question having been thus stated with a clearness and precision which leaves nothing to be desired, they proceed to state their theory.

They assign two principles as absolutely adequate to account for the essential constitution of bodies, one passive, the other active. The first they call Matter, the second Form. But what do they understand by Matter? Matter may be considered in two different aspects: as already actualized by the form, or before receiving any form whatever. In the latter aspect it is called first or primitive matter; in the former aspect it is called secondary matter. We will first give an idea of primitive matter.

It may be defined to be a certain incomplete corporal substance having neither essence, nor attribute of its own, but capable of receiving any kind of form. What do I mean by incomplete? I mean that it is not a full-fledged substance, nor could exist as such, but that to do so it must unite to another incomplete substance which officiates as the active principle in this union. We have said *corporal*, in as much as it must have the aptitude to furnish the substratum for the triple dimensions—length, depth and breadth—without which a body could not be formed.

It has no special essence, nor quantity nor quality, or any other attribute by which a being is defined and circumscribed.

You will say, you are describing an impossibility, something which cannot be conceived.

I am doing no such thing. I am not saying that such an entity as I am describing can, or does exist. For to suppose a substance incomplete having no special nature, nor essence nor attributes by which it might be, and be called something special, having a real existence of its own would be inconceivable. But I am analyzing a body in its essential principles, and to do so I must separate each principle and consider them in the abstract, and not as they really exist in the concrete. Primitive matter therefore, taken in the abstract, and not as actually existing or capable of existing, in the same manner as it is considered in the abstract, can easily be conceived as something having no special nature or attribute, but only representing a generical corporal substratum, and capable of receiving any special essence and attribute from another principle.

We say capable, because not having any special nature or attributes of its own it is indifferent to assume any nature or attribute, offering for that very reason no hindrance to be moulded into anything or form; and once having undergone one modification to change it for another *ad indefinitum*.

It follows from our definition that primitive matter is, in the first place, something real; not in the sense that it really exists in the abstract or in general, but in the sense that as a real substratum of all bodies in nature, as one of their principles, it is a reality.

It is in the second place one and the same in all bodies.

Thirdly, it is incorruptible and incapable of being generated, and also inert.

You may ask, How does this incomplete substance, possessing no nature of its own, nor any other attributes or categories attributable to being, and which, as such, cannot exist in nature, acquire actuality and real existence and become a specific something? I answer with the schoolmen by the Form. And what is meant by the Form?

It is an incomplete, simple substance having a specific nature of its own, intended to take hold of primitive matter, to actualize it and to give it its own specific nature. It is called specific because it could not exist really and independently of the primitive matter; but both must complete each other, the first yielding the substratum

and the capacity to be moulded into any thing; the other furnishing real actuality and a specific nature.

Hence the Form is: (1) the actuality of Matter; (2) it is inseparable from it; (3) the forms of things specifically different are also of different species.

A body such as exists in nature is therefore the result of this substantial composition of primitive Matter and Form, the first being the passive principle of bodies, the second the active; both forming one complete material substance.

Any one wishing to form a clear idea of the theory has but to follow up the example mentioned by Aristotle—that primitive matter stands to substantial forms as the same material to the different arts. Imagine then Michael Angelo with a raw block of marble before him. Considered from the point of view of the art of sculpture, the block has no particular form or shape. It has no specific nature, or any other attribute applicable to works of art. It is indifferent to undergo any form or shape and is capable of being broken or cut or chiselled into any thing. Michael Angelo stands before it. A multitude of forms rush and crowd upon his mind. He could impress any one of these upon that primitive material. He selects one; it is a statue. At first he reduces that block to a kind of rude, unshapely human form; then he submits it to a more delicate and finer operation, and draws from it the semblance of a solemn majestic human figure, with the human face divine. That is not sufficient; the figure must manifest the original; it must live and breathe. He works, and cuts and chisels, and polishes and corrects, and brings to perfection. He persists in it, goes over it again and again, to produce the ideal which is flashing before his mind and quickening his pulse, and redoubling his life and intensifying his energies. He stops exhausted and enchanted. There is the Moses. One looking at it would seem to see the Hebrew law-giver in his majestic carriage and mien, instinct with the vision of God just passed away, and addressing his people and enjoining upon them the mandates of the Omnipotent. None looking at it need be told that it is Moses. He speaks for himself in that masterpiece of the best among artistic productions.

What the block of marble is in respect to the chisel of Michael Angelo, primitive matter is in respect to the natural body.

That block, as we have already remarked, has no special nature or attribute, or any other denomination or category in the world of art. In fact, it is in the same world as if it did not really exist. Yet

it is the substratum, the raw material that can be moulded into anything, and acquire an honorable existence among the prodigies of human genius. Who is to do that? The artist, by impressing on it the particular form he has chosen among the thousands teeming in his mind. That piece of marble would be nothing without the Form; this, in its turn, would have no realization or actuality without the block of marble. One is, as it were, the principle of the other. The form actualizes the piece of marble as a work of art, this offers itself as a substratum to the form, and gives it support and consistency.

Primitive matter, in the corporal world, has neither essence, nor nature, nor attributes. In fact, as such, and isolated from anything else, it has no real existence or actuality. It is, *in fieri*, on the way to becoming something; because it offers no resistance, owing to the want of special nature or attributes, and is possessed of a pliability to submit to anything and to become anything in the corporal world.

The form appears. It actualizes that substratum or matter, impresses upon it its own special nature and attributes, and from that union a natural body is formed. Matter and form are two incomplete substances, incapable of real existence independent of each other. By the union they complete each other and acquire real existence in the composition resulting therefrom, that is to say, in the body as it exists in the material world. One is principle of the other, matter the passive principle, form the active.

We think we have explained with sufficient accuracy and clearness the scholastic theory as to the essential principles of bodies. To complete its explanation we must add a few words on the changing of forms.

We have said that matter is indifferent to submit to this or that form. That when it has undergone one form it does not lose the capacity of changing that form into another, and so on, ad indefinitum. It is also a common fact that bodies are continually being transformed, that is, setting aside one form to take up another. We must then inquire, How is this transformation explained in the scholastic theory? To do this we will just state a few principles.

1st: A thing may come to exist absolutely from no previously existing materials, but by the action of the Omnipotent. In this case we say that the thing exists by creation.

2d: A thing may be produced or drawn from some material already existing. In this case, in the language of the school, the thing is said to exist by generation.

3d : A thing remaining substantially the same may receive some accidental change. In this case we say the thing has undergone alteration.

4th : It is evident that a body cannot have two forms at the same time ; if it present a circular form, for instance, it cannot exhibit the square or the triangular; if it has the form of wood, it cannot present the form of ashes.

From all these principles follows that 1st, a change of form may be substantial or accidental. It is substantial when it changes the substance, as in the latter example. A piece of wood by burning becomes ashes. This change is substantial ; a piece of wood of square form is changed into a circular form. This change is accidental, the substance of the wood remaining.

2d. A substantial change in bodies cannot occur by means of creation, because the creative action excludes all previous material from entering into the formation of its effect.

3d. Therefore a substantial change in bodies can only occur by generation, in as much as by means of a natural agent, either intrinsic or external to the body, the form existing previous to the agent's operation is destroyed, and a new one is drawn from the matter, which is permanent and indestructible under any transformation. Take the example given above, a piece of wood; put the wood under the action of fire. It corrupts and destroys all nature and substance of wood by burning it to a cinder, and a new substantial form is deduced from the capacity of the indestructible primitive matter underlying all bodies, ashes.

We are aware that this theory of the substantial changes in bodies has been sneered at by some of our modern scientific wiseacres. With the modesty so peculiar to them they have uttered their fiat and their infallible pronunciamento that the theory is childish, antiquated, absurd ; that it rests on no foundation whatever except the wild dreams of musty old men. The author of "Mediæval and and Modern Cosmology" joins in the cry by saying: "Modern chemistry leaves no standing room for the Aristotelian theory of first matter and substantial form as far as the substantial changes of inorganic bodies and plants are concerned ; in this respect the only safe place of refuge for the theory seems to be the sublime and misty heights of metaphysical abstraction." (Page 16.)

In our next article we shall give proof in support of the Aristotelian theory, both as regards the essential principles of bodies, and in respect to its explanation of the substantial transformation of

bodies. Our main line of evidence will be to take all the facts which fall under the observation of mankind, all the truly and well ascertained results of science for granted. Upon these facts, and these alone, we shall raise the structure of the scholastic theory, by the aid of the reason which God has given us and the rules of logical reasoning. We shall see whether the followers of Aristotle, St. Thomas and of all the schoolmen merit the strictures affixed upon them by the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology;" or whether he and his pet friends, the scientists, possibly without being aware of it, and merely owing to over-confidence, are not the very ones who are perched in the air, and drawing largely on their imagination assert as facts and legitimate conclusions therefrom what has never been so claimed by true and honest science.

J. De Concilio.

CONFERENCES.

CASES OF CONSCIENCE.

CASE I.

EDITOR A. E. REVIEW:

Please give your views on the following theological case, and oblige many readers of your excellent periodical.

Thomas and Anna, both non-Catholics—it being a matter of doubt whether they were even baptized—meet at a summer resort, and after a brief acquaintance conclude to get married. For this purpose Thomas goes to the Rev. Fr. Emilius, a priest having charge of a congregation a few miles distant, and who happens to be a particular friend of his, and induces him to come and perform the ceremony, which he does at the hotel where they were stopping. Now it happens that Anna had a couple of years previously, contracted a marriage *coram praecone haeretico* with David, also a non-Catholic, from whom she almost immediately separated, the marriage, as afterwards testified to by herself, never having been consummated. As soon as Anna's parents heard of her union with Thomas they took steps immediately to have the marriage annulled, by persuading her to institute divorce proceedings, on the ground that Thomas was a minor at the time of his marriage, he being only eighteen years of age, and the consent of his parents had not been previously obtained, as required by the laws of the state—the real cause, however, being that they considered Thomas beneath them in station. A divorce was granted. Immediately after the Court proceedings David appears on the scene again; and, a reconciliation having been effected between Anna and himself, he remarries her, and now lives with her.

What is to be said of her marriage with Thomas—and what of the priest who assisted at such marriage under the circumstances?

The priest afterwards said in extenuation that he merely assisted at it as a magistrate or in a civil capacity. Could he do this?

How does he stand in view of the case *coram ecclesia?* An answer in an early number of the REVIEW will greatly oblige.

SACERDOS VEXATUS.

Answer.

The marriage with Thomas was null and void from the beginning, not because of his age (eighteen years) nor for want of his parents' consent (this would at most have made the act unlawful and punishable, but not invalid), but because the lady had been already married to, and was at that time, the lawful wife of David. The fact that this prior marriage had not been consummated (a fact moreover which her testimony alone would be insufficient to establish) did not prevent it from being a true and valid marriage, which once contracted, the parties themselves could never dissolve.

As for Fr. Emilius, it was his duty either not to assist at all, or at least before doing so to have made careful inquiry as to whether the parties were free to marry. It looks very much as if he failed to do this and so violated a grave obligation. He ought not to have been content with a mere State license, if there were one, but should have made proper inquiries himself. Possibly, however, he may have done so and been deceived. The mere act of assisting as an authorized witness, without using any Catholic rite or benediction, at a non-Catholic marriage otherwise lawful, does not appear to be reprehensible; the reasons alleged by some against it do not seem very strong. It was done by some of our early missionaries and is favored by such theologians as Laymann, Lacroix, St. Lignori and others. See Laymann, Lib. V, Tr. X, p. 2, 4, 8. Lacroix, II 99. St. Alphonsus, VI, 54.

The doubt as to their baptism, if investigation failed to clear it up, would not practically matter much, as a really doubtful baptism is for the purpose of marriage to be held as valid.

L. V. McC.

CASE II.

A priest of a certain diocese, without having been guilty of any very grievous fault, has nevertheless proved very unsatisfactory to his bishop. He has been imprudent to the verge of scandal, light and frivolous in his conduct, and a constant cause of disagreement and annoyance to the priests in various parts of the diocese in which the bishop has placed him. At length the bishop told him he could not keep him any longer, and gave him "leave of absence" for five years, without, however, putting him under canonical censure, and told him he might go to any bishop that would receive him. The priest left, was received by another bishop and placed in charge

of a mission with the same faculties as the other priests of that diocese. It was understood, however, that he still claimed affiliation to his former diocese, and at any time might return to it, or might be recalled by his former bishop. Nevertheless, it was implicitly understood, though not committed to writing, that his present bishop would not dismiss him as long as he proved satisfactory.

After some time he became troublesome, unsatisfactory, and finally disobedient and openly defiant of the bishop's authority. The bishop then formally dismissed him in writing; depriving him of all connection with the diocese, and forbidding him the exercise of any ecclesiastical function or duty in the diocese. After receiving this notice, the priest went to another part of the diocese, where there was no resident priest, and taking possession of the chalice, vestments, etc., celebrated Mass, preached and gave Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament.

Quaeritur: Did the priest incur irregularity by exercising these functions? And, if so, what must be done should he desire to return to his former diocese, to which he really belongs?

LEVITICUS.

Answer.

I. No. A formal suspension would be required.

II. His bishop would have power to absolve him; and in this country any priest authorized to hear confessions, in virtue of the special faculties usually, if not always, given.

L. V. McC.

CATHOLIC PRIESTS AT PROTESTANT FUNERALS.

Qu. Recently an Episcopal minister died here with whom I had been on friendly terms for a number of years. The family sent me an invitation to the funeral which I politely declined, but my absence, under the circumstances, must have been remarked. Could I have stretched the principle of charity without compromise of my faith?

Resp. For a priest to participate in a Protestant function, such as the funeral service of a minister, would be equivalent to saying openly there is no distinction of religious worship which binds us in conscience. It would be a practical denial of the truth that Christ established but one church as the means of salvation, open to all, and which no authority of man can alter to make it agreeable to

the larger number under the plea of charity. If we failed to insist upon the perogatives of that Church, men would cease to examine the claims of the Catholic Church as the sole heir of that grand inheritance the neglect of which bears such awful consequences to the thoughtless and indifferent. On the other hand the absence of a priest under the circumstances as given above, is a direct assertion of that claim, and whilst it may wound for the time the feelings of those who consider themselves slighted, it may cause them to think seriously of the reason, especially where a priest shows in every other way that he is kindly disposed and generous in his judgment of others.

As to the mind of the Church on the subject it is very well expressed by the following answer of the S. Congregation in a similar case, at least so far as the *principle* involved is the same.

DUBIUM.

An Sacerdos Catholicus in locis, quibus hæretici proprios non habent ministros, possit comitari cadaver hæretici a domo ad cœmeterium, etsi cadaver in ecclesiam non deferatur, neque campanæ pulsentur? Et quatenus affirmative, an ejusmodi praxis permittatur aut toleretur aliquibus in locis specialibus tantum, aut extendi possit etiam ad Italiam nostram? Et quatenus affirmative, quibusnam sacris indumentis uti valet sacerdos hoc in comitatu, si præcedi debeat a Cruce?

Resp. Ad primum: *Negative.* Ad secundum et tertium: *Provisum in primo.* S. I. C, 19 Jan. 1886 ad Archiep. Utinens.

ANALECTA.

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EX S. CONGR. INDULGENTIARUM.

Indulgenced Prayer to St. John Evang.

Beatissime Pater,

Ioannes Ponzi sacerdos romanus ad pedes S. V. humiliter provolutus S. V. exorat, ut universis Christifidelibus, qui infrascriptam orationem in honorem S. Ioannis Apostoli et Evangelistae recitaverint, aliquam Indulgentiam benigne tribuere dignetur.

ORATIO.

Inclite Apostole, qui ob tuam virginalem puritatem Iesu tam carus extitisti, ut supra pectus eius reclinares caput, quique dignus es habitus quem, loco sui, Matri beatissimae uti filium relinqueret ; da mihi, supplex oro, ut Iesum et Mariam flagrantissima caritate complectar.

Fac quaeso, tuâ ad Deum prece, ut ego quoque, cordè ab omni terrena affectione emundato, Iesu fidelis discipulus, Mariae filius amans, semper adhaeream in terris, ut eis in sempiternum coniungi merear in Caelis. Amen.

(*S. Cong. Indulg., 21 Martii, 1891.*)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

O glorious Apostle, who on account of thy virginal purity wert so dear to Jesus as to be permitted to rest thy head upon His breast, and who wert considered worthy to be left in His stead as a son to His most blessed Mother; grant, I beseech thee, that I may become attached to Jesus and Mary with a most ardent affection. Pray to God for me, I implore thee, that with a heart cleansed from every earthly affection, I may be ever devoted on earth to Jesus as His faithful disciple, and to Mary, as her loving child, so that in heaven I may merit to be for ever united with them. Amen.

SSmus Dñus Noster Leo PP. XIII. in audientia habita die 21 Martii, 1891, ab infrascripto Secretario S. Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, benigne concessit omnibus utriusque sexus Christifidelibus, corde saltem contrito, ac devote recitantibus supradictam orationem, Indulgentiam, defunctis quoque applicabilem, *Centum dierum*, semel in die lucrandam. Praesenti in perpetuum valituro absque ulla Brevis expeditione. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Datum Romae ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis die 21 Martii 1891.

I. Card. D'Annibale *Praef.*

Al. Archiep. Nicop. *Secretarius.*

COMMUNICATIO IN SACRIS.

Instructio ad parochos Urbis 12 Julii 1878 italice data per Vic. gen. suæ Sanctitatis, Card. Monaco, quæ in S. Officio examinata et a Leone XIII. approbata, ab eodem Cardinali, qua Episcopo Albanensi, in Synodo Diœcesana anno 1886 in translatione, ut sequitur, evulgata est.[1]

1. Excommunicationem latæ sententiæ Romano Pontifici speciali modo reservatam incurrunt illi omnes, qui etiamsi animo hæresi non adhæreant, sese vel nomine tenus adscribunt sectæ, cujuscumque sit ea nominis, hæreticæ vel schismaticæ, quacumque de causa id fiat.

2 Item qui communicant damnatis hæreticorum aut schismaticorum ritibus ubicunque illos exerceant: vel qui conciones, collationes aut disputationes eorum audiunt illa impia ac nefaria mente, ut *si quidem persuasi fuerint* fidem eis sint habituri.

3 Item qui auctores quoquo modo aliis sese præbent adeundi fana seu aulas hæreticorum ad horum conciones aut sermones aut disputationes audiendas, quocumque modo hæc incitatio fiat, nempe pecunia, auctoritate,

1. Translationem parum differentem habes apud Act. S. Sed. XI. p. 168 seq.

consilio, vel etiam solummodo propositis clam seu palam invitamentis (avvisi).

4. Peccant vero graviter qui vel sola curiositate ducti scienter ingrediuntur fana seu aulas hæreticorum dum hi conciones vel collationes habent, quique illas audiunt, similiter qui damnatis eorum sacris materialiter tantum adstant eisque communicant, et vel cantu aut musicis instrumentis eisdem sacris co-operantur, etsi id fiat solius lucri aviditate.

5. Nec a peccato gravi excusantur, qui fanis hæreticorum extruendis architectos operumve edemptores ac præfectos agunt: excusantur tamen caementarii eorumque adjutores si absque ulla co-operandi hæreticorum sacris intentione, secluso etiam scandalo, rem agant, et dummodo opus manifeste non fiat in contemptum catholicæ religionis. At parochorum et confessariorum sollicita erit cura minores ejusmodi artifices monendi, ut ab ipso materiali opere locando omnino abstineant, quando vel opus communiter habeatur ut signum falsam religionem protestans, vel aliquid contineat quod unice et directe approbationem damnati hæreticorum cultus portendat, vel si constet ad opus eos vocari aut cogi in contemptum catholicæ religionis.

6. Multo autem gravioris et supra quam dici aut cogitari possit enormis culpæ rei fiunt parentes, qui in animas filiorum suorum vere crudeles eos ad scholas hæreticorum mittunt, etiam quod intolerabilius est, vi adhibita. Et horum quidem tum parentum tum filiorum resipiscentiam omnibus modis per parochos et confessarios procurari deberi palam est. Quamdiu vero parentes animo obdurati filios minime ab hæreticorum disciplina revocaverint, a sacramentis arcendi erunt. Nec ipsi etiam filii, si scienter et sponte illas scholas adeant, a gravi peccato excusari possunt. In casibus autem veræ coactionis confessariorum erit eos monere et dirigere, personarum ac rerum perpensis adjunctis, juxta regulas a probatis auctoribus circa similes casus traditas.

7. Graviter item peccant typographi etiam gregales qui libris hæreticorum edendis dant operam, licet id metu expulsionis agant. Si autem res erit de impressione libri in quo propugnatur hæresis, nec secundarii ministri effugiunt excommunicationem speciali modo Summo Pontifici reservatam.

RESPONSUM S. PŒNIT. DE DISPENSATIONIBUS SEDE VACANTE.

Infrascriptus Episcopus L. devotissime exponit dubium quod sequitur: Vicario Capitulari, tempore, quo sedes episcopalis vacat, dispensationes matrimoniales exequendæ a S. Sede committuntur. Peracta verificatione causarum necnon imposita separatione sponsorum vi litterarum apostolicarum præscripta, Vicarius Capitularis officio suo cessat, eo quod novus Episcopus munus episcopale legitime exercendum suscepit. Hinc quæritur:

I. Utrum Vicarius Capitularis executionem dispensationis, in qua, ut supra, res non jam integra est, usque ad finem peragere valide possit?

II. An a novo Ordinario ejusmodi executio perficienda sit? Et, casu affirmative ad secundum, iterum quæritur:

III. Utrum novus Ordinarius dispensationem exequendam suscipere

valeat statu, quo actu reperitur, ita ut non requiratur nova verificatio causarum ab ipso instituenda nec nova separatio sponsorum ab ipso imponenda? An executionem ab initio ita suscipere debeat, quam si Vicarius Capitularis nihil in eo negotio jam fecisset, id est, quam si res omnino jam integra esset?

Sacra Pœnitentiaria ad præfata dubia rescribit prout sequitur:

Ad I. *Negative;*

Ad II. *Negative*, si dispensationes remissæ fuerint Vicario Capitulari; *affirmative* vero, si remissæ fuerint Ordinario;

Ad III. *Negative* ad primam partem; *affirmative* ad secundam.

S. Pœnitentiaria 3 Apr. 1886.

DE ABSOLUTIONE A CENSURIS.

RESPONSUM DE OFFICII DE 29 AUG. 1888.

1. Utrum absolutio a censuris *omnibus catholicis qui coram hæretico ministro* nuptias contraxerunt, *necessaria sit*, an potius in eo tantum casu impertienda sit, quo in hujusmodi celebrationem ab Antistite censuræ promulgatæ sint? Et quatenus negative ad primam partem, quæritur:

2. Utrum absolutio a censuris necessaria sit eis saltem, qui in hujusmodi nuptiis, consenserunt acatholicæ prolium educationi?

3. Num hæc absolutio requiratur solummodo tanquam formalitas in executione dispensationis stylo Curiæ inducta, an etiam iis catholicis sit necessaria, qui post matrimonium coram acatholico ministro valide initum cum Ecclesia reconciliari desiderant?

Feria IV, die 29 Aug. 1888, in Congregatione generali S. Inquisitionis Eminentissimi Patres responderi mandaverunt:

Ad primum: *Affirmative ad primam partem, negative ad secundam.*

Ad secundum et tertium: *Provisum in primo.* Eadem feria ac die Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Eminentissimorum PP. resolutionem approbavit.

BOOK REVIEW.

R. P. BERNARDINI A PICONIO TRIPLEX EXPOSITIO B. PAULI APOSTOLI EPISTOLAE AD ROMANOS. Ad Usum Studiosorum S. Theol. et Sacerdotum. Per P. Michaelem Hetzenauer, Ord. Cap.—Oeniponte, Typis et Sumptib. Societatis Marianae. MDCCCXCI.

The "Triplex Expositio" is so well known to students of theology and biblical letters that no apology need be offered for republishing it. The saintly author had written it as one who, having withdrawn from the active world, occupies himself in spiritual retreat with the study of the S. Scriptures, and who notes down, with the habitual order of a well-trained mind, whatever lights come to him during times of special illumination, in order that he may feed his soul on their repetition afterwards. We owe the publication of the work, in the first instance, to the learned Bishop Faydeau, the intimate friend of the humble Capucin. The latter, however, had to bear a good deal of censure and annoyance from the Jansenistic party, who tried to prevent the circulation of this book by every means in their power. Nevertheless, it gained continually in popularity with the better class of theologians, and for well nigh two hundred years has served as a standard of reference to the interpretation of the Pauline Epistles. The present editor gives us the Epistle to the Romans; but it is not a mere republication of the original work. Whilst the order of Analysis, Paraphrase and Commentary are preserved, even in detail, many errors have been corrected. These were of minor or no importance heretofore, but have become more marked in the light of recent exegesis. For the same reason, valuable additions have been made throughout. The Greek text has been added to that of the Latin Vulgate, for the purpose of exact criticism. Many notes of an historical and ascetical character have been inserted, so that the work of Bernardino a Piconio, precious for its sterling critical worth before, has become doubly so in this new edition. This applies both from the practical and theoretical point of view.

PHILIP; A TALE OF THE COAL REGIONS. By Patrick Justin McMahon.—Philadelphia: H. L. Kilner & Co.

Mr. McMahon tells an interesting story about the life of the miners in the Pennsylvania coal regions during the time when the secret society of the so-called "Mollie Maguires" was terrorizing the entire district. The novel throws much incidental light on facts which to the ordinary reader of the history of that period must bear a more or less mysterious

character. Apart from this, the whole plot is fashioned with a view to teaching sound moral lessons. Much skill is shown throughout in the portrayal of character, and Father Moran is the typical faithful pastor, not wholly devoid of human nature. The style of the book is unusually natural, and occasionally marked by a happy blending of good sense and humor.

The book is well printed, and forms a good installment of the "Catholic Library," published by Messrs. Kilner & Co.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE BALTIMORE CATECHISM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. For the use of Sunday-School Teachers and Advanced Classes. By Rev. Thomas L. Kinkead—Benziger Bros., 1892.

The notice of a forthcoming explanation of the Baltimore Catechism was received with general satisfaction; and now that the work has appeared, it will, without doubt, find a general welcome. A work intended to assist those who teach Christian doctrine to the children in our parishes has been greatly needed; the book before us is destined for this end, and is admirably adapted to the purpose for which it was written. In his preface, Father Kinkead tells us the mission of his book; it is intended, primarily, as an aid to the Sunday-School teacher. A long experience in Sunday-School work has convinced Father Kinkead that some reliable source of information by which the Catechism might be developed and supplemented is absolutely necessary. Merely calling the roll, marking the attendance and hearing the lesson, is not teaching Christian doctrine. The questions and answers must be explained. But where was the teacher to look for what he needed? The work before us offers a rich store of useful, practical, earnest teachings, well calculated to instruct, to impress, and to edify those who listen to its words. In a style remarkable for its grace, as well as for its simplicity, Father Kinkead comments in order on each question in the Catechism. His remarks are so simple that anybody can readily understand them and so interesting that a Sunday-School teacher can with their help make the lesson entertaining. Comparisons, analogies, illustrations, examples taken from every-day life, abound in the work, and give it a pleasing air of freshness and originality.

The "*Explanation*" will, as its author hopes, be found useful for the instruction of converts and for reading in Catholic families, in the Catechism classes of our parochial schools, in academies and other institutions. Father Kinkead's work may well find a place on the desk of every teacher. All priests who have ever examined Catechism classes, or have charge of the spiritual direction of children, must have noticed the false ideas conveyed to the little ones by indiscreet, inadequate, or faulty instructions. Without any disrespect to the efficient teachers in our Catholic schools, attention may be drawn to the fact that the members of many teaching-communities and congregations have had no opportunity of studying a course of theology; consequently we cannot be surprised to find them unable to impart to their pupils a thorough or accurate knowledge of the great doc-

trines of Christianity. In some instances a mistaken zeal may lead them to fill in the tedious Catechism hour with blood-curdling stories of apparitions, ghosts and visions, or with tales of little girls who were sent to hell because they were proud of their curls and concealed this awful crime in confession; of donkeys that kneel on Christmas night when the clock strikes twelve, all of which narratives are strictly articles of the children's faith, all received by the youthful mind just as it receives the Trinity or the Incarnation,—because God has revealed them, and "our teacher told us so." Nobody can fail to see the great harm resulting from such a course; in after years the mind will revolt against such miserable nonsense; and in that revolt the sacred truths of Christianity may easily be included. Father Kinkead's work, if carefully studied, will be a great help to our teachers in school or in Sunday School; and we think that it might, with great advantage to the children, be used as a text-book in more advanced classes of Christian doctrine.

J. J. S.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Tobias Mullen, Bishop of Erie.—Fr. Pustet & Co., 1892. Pp XXIV, 664.

Our English Catholic literature on the Bible is very scant. Especially is this a fact in regard to works introductory to Scriptural study. Outside of Dr. Dixon's work, which, though excellent in its day and sphere, is now somewhat behind the advance of its line, there is hardly anything in English by a Catholic hand that will guide a thorough student. In Latin, French and German such works are numerous, but they are locked up for those who have not keys to their language. We are informed that an able Professor of Exegesis in one of our leading Catholic seminaries intends publishing his course of Introduction, and rumor had it a year ago that the English Jesuits were contemplating an extensive Commentary on the Sacred Text. Biblical students will hail with joy these adjuncts to knowledge. In the meantime they will welcome the present scholarly contribution to their study—Bishop Mullen's work on the Old Testament Canon.

The main point which its author aims to prove, and the candid reader will admit his success, is that the "Canon of the Old Testament is that catalogue of books of which, together with those of the New Testament, the Council of Trent in its fourth session declared God to be the author." The line of argument establishes: 1st, That in the old law God charged the High Priest with the guardianship of the sacred books, and the commission to decide as to the adding to the collection such writings as appeared from time to time. This trust must, by analogy, have been handed over from the Jewish pontificate to the High Priest of the Christian dispensation. 2d, The Old Testament Canon in the days of our Lord was not contained in the present Hebrew text, but in the Septuagint. 3d, The Apostles transmitted this version to the churches which they established. "That the Apostles did so seems indisputable in view of the fact that not only the Roman Church founded by SS. Peter and Paul, but

all those schismatical communities which at first maintained communion with that church, but ceased to do so, most of them more than a thousand years ago, find their Canon of the Old Testament solely in the Septuagint, or in a version of it, instead of in the existing Hebrew Scriptures. In fact, East as well as West, this is still as it was the case everywhere until Martin Luther and his Protestant disciples borrowed the Jewish Canon in the sixteenth century, a time when that Canon was no longer what it had been when the Redeemer lived among men, or when the Apostles delivered the Scriptures of the Old as well as the New Testament to the Christian Church" (p. 636). These arguments are all developed with great fullness. For instance, some thirteen elaborate chapters are given to the history of the Hebrew and Septuagint Canons; five to the Canon among the Schismatics; seven to its fate amongst the sects, ancient and modern; four of these chapters are devoted to the English Protestant version alone. Eight chapters are given to the Catholic, especially the English, versions. In connection with these subjects, a large amount of pertinent matter is introduced, for example, on the history and purpose of Bible Societies, on the attitude of the Church regarding popular Bible reading, the principles on which the Protestant fixing of the Canon is based, the force of the Tridentine decree.

All this wealth of material is not simply exposed. It is treated with a critic's discernment. Modestly, because truly, Bishop Mullen professes his attitude toward those who disagree with his Thesis. "Throughout the discussion of the principal question . . . the reader will find that the sentiments expressed by eminent writers, whether Christian or Jewish, who respect the Tridentine Canon of the Old Testament, have been fairly stated, indeed, generally in their own words; and that the references in each case have been plainly . . . indicated in the foot notes. Rarely has an appeal been made to the Christian Fathers, or to the action taken by Ecclesiastical Councils in reference to the compass of the Old Testament, and hardly has any attention been devoted to objections derived from this source. Because to have done so would have required at least another volume, which may or may not, according to circumstances, be written hereafter, although materials are already at hand for the purpose" (p. 638).

One must deplore the condition of things which necessitate a scholar to restrict to one volume his treatment of so vast a subject. But we trust that the reception of this book will warrant not only the completion of its author's design, but also the expansion in a subsequent edition of the present volume into two, so as to give room for fuller reference to the entire range of recent kindred literature.

The work appeals to the clergy. In no single book will they find so much useful material on the general composition of the Old Testament and connected subjects. To reach as much they must peruse many a volume. It appeals to the intelligent Catholic layman, whom it will enlighten as to the attitude of the Church in establishing, maintaining, and spreading the S. Scripture, and enable him to answer thoroughly the calumnies of her enemies on this head. It is not intended merely for

specialists, or profound students. Its clear, straightforward style adapts it to the comprehension of any serious, fairly educated reader. It appeals, also, especially to those outside the Catholic Church, for it deals with a theme, which, as its author observes, "no Christian, and least of all a Protestant can regard with indifference. The Bible is justly regarded the Book of Books, the best of all books: because it alone has God as its author. It has been written for our instruction and edification; that by reading and meditating on its contents we may be enabled through the grace of God to live well, and die well, and be happy forever. Whether therefore, we have the Bible, and have it as it was written by God, is a question that concerns us all, a question which demands immediate and profound attention, especially from every one who is not absolutely certain that he has in his Bible all those sacred books, which the Christain Church received as such from those by whom she was founded. For until he is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that his Bible is complete, every Christian has a right to suspect that it does not embrace all truths which God requires him to believe, or that books contained in other Bibles, but omitted in his, may explicitly set forth some revealed doctrines, which being but vaguely, perhaps not at all, referred to in the books in his canon, he therefore doubts, if he does not actually deny, and doubts or denies to his own condemnation." (p. 637.)

"The Bible," says the Rev. Dr. Philip Schaff in the January *Forum*, "is independent of all human theories of inspiration and stands upon the impregnable rock of truth. It is not a manual of geology, or biology, or astronomy, or chronology, or history, or science. Even the Pope of Rome does not claim infallibility in any of these departments. The Bible is a book of religion, a rule of faith and duty, no more, no less." And yet how are those who refuse allegiance to an infallible Church, in these days when, as Dr. Schaff admits, "the original autographs [of the Bible] which nobody has seen or will see—for they are irretrievably lost," when, too, modern infidel criticism is tearing the sacred book into shreds, how, I say, are they to determine what were the original contents of the Bible, the divinely given "rule of faith and duty?" The question is an old one, yet it is ever new and needs oft-repeated answering. How fully, learnedly, clearly it can be answered in the light of Biblical science of to-day, the reader will find in Bishop Mullen's present work.

F. P. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

ON CHRISTIAN ART. By Edith Healy. With an Introduction by Rt. Rev. J. L. Spalding, D. D.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1892.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By V. Rev. B. F. Verhegen, O. S. B.—Benziger Bros.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Tobias Mullen, Bishop of Erie.—New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1892.